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THE LIBERAL CASE FOR HOBBY LOBBY 
Brett H. McDonnell* 
The Supreme Court decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. has stirred 
strong objections from political liberals. Those objections are misguided, and the 
Court’s opinion reflects core liberal values of social responsibility and tolerance 
of diversity. 
In the first half of its decision, the Court held that in some circumstances, for-
profit corporations committed to religious goals may invoke the religious liberty 
protection of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Liberals have 
treated this as an appalling and/or humorous extension of rights, which should 
apply only to humans. However, the Court’s decision rightly recognizes that 
corporations can, and sometimes do, pursue goals other than shareholder profits. 
This fits well with the stress on corporate social responsibility one finds in 
progressive corporate law scholarship such as the Author’s. Where religious 
beliefs shape a corporation’s purposes, the protections of RFRA may rightly apply. 
This Article suggests a detailed framework for determining when particular 
corporations are engaged in the exercise of religion, looking to both 
organizational and ownership dimensions of commitment to religion. This 
framework clarifies the somewhat sketchy analysis of the Court and more firmly 
roots that analysis in corporate law and theory. 
In the second half of the opinion, the Court held that the contraceptive mandate of 
the Affordable Care Act substantially burdens the religious exercise of employers, 
and that the mandate is not the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling 
governmental objective. Liberals fear that this holding aggressively extends the 
protection of RFRA while undermining the compelling goal of the contraceptive 
mandate. In fact, the holding is quite nuanced and limited, and much liberal 
reaction reflects discomfort with RFRA itself. That is a shame, as creating a 
diverse society where persons and groups with differing beliefs are able to coexist 
is a core liberal commitment. Liberals may have lost sight of this commitment as 
the groups invoking RFRA’s protection have shifted from social outcasts to more 
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mainstream religious conservatives. That may explain, but does not justify, liberal 
opposition to Hobby Lobby. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 778 
I. LEGAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND ................................................................ 783 
II. RFRA AND THE DILEMMA OF FOR-PROFIT CORPORATIONS ............................ 787 
III. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING RFRA STANDING ....................................... 791 
IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S OPINION FITS WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK ................ 802 
V. SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN .................................................................................... 809 
VI. LEAST RESTRICTIVE MEANS ........................................................................... 815 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 820 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In June of 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court announced its decision in 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.1 The Court held that the contraceptive 
mandate provision implemented under the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”)2 violated 
the free exercise right under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”)3 of 
the plaintiff, for-profit corporations. The case received a huge amount of media 
attention—more than any case of that term for the Court. Reaction to the decision 
was intense and highly polarized. Conservatives celebrated,4 while liberals 
expressed outrage.5 That liberal reaction began with Justice Ginsburg’s vehement 
dissent, which forecasts a perilously slippery slope of potential future cases.6 
                                                                                                                
 1. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 2. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119 (2010). 
 3. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–2000bb-4 
(2012). 
 4.  See Kendall Breitman, Right Celebrates Hobby Lobby Ruling on Twitter, 
POLITICO (June 30, 2014, 12:24 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/06/hobby-lobby-
ruling-reactions-twitter-108440.html. 
 5. See Tina Nguyen, ‘I Feel Sick’: Liberal Pundits React to SCOTUS Hobby 
Lobby Ruling, MEDIAITE (June 30, 2014, 11:09 AM), http://www.mediaite.com/online/i-
feel-sick-liberal-pundits-react-to-scotus-hobby-lobby-ruling/; Richard Thompson Ford, 
Hobby Lobby Decision Is Proof That Antidiscrimination Laws Often Discriminate, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 1, 2015, 6:02 PM), 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/06/30/congress-religion-and-the-supreme-
courts-hobby-lobby-decision/hobby-lobby-decision-is-proof-that-antidiscrimination-laws-
often-discriminate; Marci A. Hamilton, Hobby Lobby Has Opened a Minefield of Extreme 
Religious Liberty, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2014, 1:24 PM), 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/06/30/congress-religion-and-the-supreme-
courts-hobby-lobby-decision/hobby-lobby-has-opened-a-minefield-of-extreme-religious-
liberty; Mark Tushnet, True Religious Freedom Leaves State Out of It, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 
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One can break the decision in Hobby Lobby down into two main parts, 
and liberals have objected vigorously to both. In the first part, the Court held that, 
in appropriate circumstances, for-profit corporations committed to pursuing 
religious goals may invoke the religious liberty protections of RFRA. Many have 
seen this as an unjustified extension of rights of a sort that should extend only to 
live persons, not artificial persons such as corporations.7 It is seen as part of an 
ongoing movement by the Court’s conservative majority to tilt the playing field 
towards corporations.8 
The second part of the decision involves the application of RFRA to the 
ACA contraceptive mandate. The Court held that the contraceptive mandate 
substantially burdens the free exercise rights of religious corporations, and that the 
government could not justify that burden as the least restrictive means of achieving 
a compelling interest.9 Critics claim that the Court found a burden on employers 
where no real burden existed and ignored the costs imposed on female 
employees.10 They fear the case will be used to undermine a number of other laws, 
with attention particularly focused on anti-discrimination laws.11 Underlying this 
reaction seems to be distrust of RFRA itself, and a desire to strictly cabin the 
statute. 
This Article argues that the liberal reaction to each part of the Hobby 
Lobby decision is misguided. Rather, the decision is rooted in principles liberals 
should find deeply attractive. The corporate standing to sue analysis reflects a view 
of the corporation that closely resembles the picture drawn by progressive 
corporate law scholars.12 The majority opinion stresses that corporations can, and 
                                                                                                                
2014, 8:28 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/06/30/congress-religion-
and-the-supreme-courts-hobby-lobby-decision/true-religious-freedom-leaves-state-out-of-it. 
 6. Infra note 163 and accompanying text. 
 7. Kent Greenfield, Hobby Lobby Symposium: Hobby Lobby, 
“Unconstitutional Conditions,” and Corporate Law Mistakes, SCOTUSBLOG (June 30, 
2014, 9:07 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/hobby-lobby-symposium-hobby-
lobby-unconstitutional-conditions-and-corporate-law-mistakes/; Binyamin Applebaum, 
What the Hobby Lobby Ruling Means for America, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 27, 2014, at 
MM14; Dana Milbank, In Hobby Lobby Ruling, the Supreme Court Uses a ‘Fiction,’ 
WASH. POST (June 30, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/dana-milbank-in-
hobby-lobby-ruling-the-supreme-court-uses-a-fiction/2014/06/30/37663c72-009b-11e4-
8572-4b1b969b6322_story.html. 
 8. The other recent Court decision that has been most demonized in a similar 
way is Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 9. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014).  
 10. Emily Bazelon, Supreme Court Breakfast Table: Corporations Had an 
Incredible Year at the Supreme Court, SLATE (June 30, 2014, 6:43 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_breakfast_table/features/2014/scotus_r
oundup/supreme_court_hobby_lobby_decision_it_was_all_about_sex.html; Dahlia 
Lithwick, After Hobby Lobby, SLATE (July 9, 2014, 6:05 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2014/07/after_hobby_lobby_mucullen_and
_harris_v_quinn_the_men_of_the_supreme_court.html. 
 11. Ford, supra note 5. 
 12. See KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL 
FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES (2007); PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence 
E. Mitchell ed., 1995); Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby 
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do pursue a large variety of ends beyond simply maximizing the profit that flows 
to shareholders. Corporations may be used to pursue moral goals that aim to make 
the world a better place—an idea that resonates with the (generally left-of-center) 
corporate social responsibility movement.13 Where such goals are rooted in 
religious principles, a corporation may, and should, be able to invoke RFRA 
protections. 
The liberal reaction to the second half of the Hobby Lobby decision shows 
that many contemporary liberals have drifted away from a core commitment of the 
liberal tradition. “Liberal” is derived from “liberty,” and liberalism has 
traditionally strongly supported religious liberty for all.14 This is rooted in a 
commitment to creating a diverse society where persons and groups with differing 
beliefs are able to co-exist with as much room as possible to exercise those beliefs 
without constraint. RFRA reflects and attempts to advance that commitment, and 
the Hobby Lobby decision for the most part reasonably balances the competing 
interests of religiously minded employers’ liberty and employee access to health 
care under the ACA. 
This Article argues that Hobby Lobby reflects and advances these core 
liberal values in the following seven sections. Part I describes the history of RFRA 
and the cases cited in Hobby Lobby. Of particular note here is the strong liberal 
support for the principles underlying RFRA, both by liberal justices in the old Free 
Exercise clause cases and by congressional Democrats and President Clinton in the 
passage of RFRA. 
Part II introduces the corporate standing issue, i.e., whether and when for-
profit corporations should be protected under RFRA. It presents the two best 
arguments against such standing. One argument is that those who run such 
corporations allegedly have a fiduciary duty to focus solely on maximizing 
shareholder financial returns.15 The other argument is that corporations have a 
separate legal personality quite distinct from their shareholders, and it is 
                                                                                                                
Lobby, 70 BUS. LAW. 1 (2014/2015); Brett H. McDonnell, Employee Primacy, or 
Economics Meets Civic Republicanism at Work, 13 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 334 (2008). 
Note that insofar as there is an identified left-of-center group of scholars within American 
corporate law, it has tended to use the term “progressive” rather than “liberal.” Many 
political activists also use that term. In this paper, I occasionally use the term “progressive,” 
but mostly stick with the term “liberal” to describe those who tend towards left-of-center 
views in politics. I do so because that term remains the most-used word for such persons 
within U.S. politics today. Perhaps more significantly, I use the term “liberal” because of its 
ties to the concept of liberty. 
 13. For an overview of related issues, see Ian B. Lee, The Role of the Public 
Interest in Corporate Law, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 
106 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012). For a recent survey of the economics 
literature, see Markus Kutzmueller & Jay Shimshack, Economic Perspectives on Corporate 
Social Responsibility, 50 J. ECON. LIT. 51 (2012). 
 14. One can see this in the great liberal thinkers from John Locke, see JOHN 
LOCKE, LETTERS CONCERNING TOLERATION (1689), to John Rawls, see DANIEL A. 
DOMBROWSKI, RAWLS AND RELIGION: THE CASE FOR POLITICAL LIBERALISM (2001). For a 
recent statement of this tradition, see MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN 
DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY (2008). 
 15. See infra notes 73–77 and accompanying text. 
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inappropriate to infer corporate religious beliefs from the beliefs of individual 
shareholders.16 
Part III then analyzes the flaws in those two arguments, and builds upon 
that analysis to suggest a framework for assessing when a corporation may claim 
RFRA protection. As progressive corporate law scholars have stressed contra the 
duty argument, corporations may legitimately pursue a wide variety of ends.17 The 
argument against standing based on the separate legal personality of corporations 
is (somewhat) valid when opposing one particular way of deriving RFRA standing 
for corporations. That argument looks to the religious beliefs of individual 
shareholders. A better grounded argument for corporate RFRA standing looks to 
commitments made within the legal structure of a corporation, with the board of 
directors as the key decision-maker. The resulting framework for analyzing RFRA 
standing considers two dimensions: organizational and ownership. Along each 
dimension, a corporation can vary from no to high religious commitment. 
Ownership looks to the number and concentration of shareholders, and the degree 
to which they share strongly held religious beliefs. More importantly, the 
organizational dimension looks to various ways in which the corporation, as an 
organization, has formally or informally committed to following a religious 
purpose. Where a corporation shows a strong, pervasive, and lasting commitment 
through the dimensions in combination, that corporation helps to advance the 
religious purpose of various groups who come together in the business. 
Part IV analyzes the Court’s opinion in Hobby Lobby and shows that it is 
quite consistent with the arguments and framework presented in Part III. The Court 
sees corporations as collective organizations that help a range of constituents 
pursue not just financial gains, but also a variety of other goals. Liberals seem to 
have been blinded either by a strong distrust of corporations or by an inability to 
identify with socially motivated businesses whose goals flow from religious beliefs 
rather than more secular values. A clearer picture shows that the Court’s vision of 
corporations is highly consistent with liberal visions of the corporation. 
Parts V and VI explore the Court’s application of RFRA to the ACA 
contraceptive mandate. Part V considers whether the mandate imposes a 
substantial burden on religious employers. The majority and the dissent grasp 
opposing sides of a real dilemma. The dissent argues that the link between 
employers and the use of controversial contraceptives is too indirect and, as such, 
the statute does not substantially burden employers. However, this position 
requires uniform acceptance of individual complicity in complex causal situations, 
which itself is a hotly debated topic on which moral traditions differ.18 The 
majority prefers to accept believers’ assertions that the mandate places a burden on 
                                                                                                                
 16. See infra notes 78–80 and accompanying text. 
 17. There is some debate over how far the Court goes in this direction, with 
some arguing that the Court thinks that other ends are appropriate only where shareholders 
have explicitly approved such goals. I argue that the best interpretation of the majority 
opinion, as a whole, assumes that corporations may pursue other goals more readily than 
that. See infra notes 128–45 and accompanying text. 
 18. See infra notes 182–91 and accompanying text. 
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their religious principles.19 Although this position opens the door to potential 
abuse,20 the majority’s approach is truer to the purpose of RFRA than that of the 
dissent. However, it should be stressed that the Court should closely examine 
whether the asserted religious beliefs are truly genuine in future cases.21 
Part VI analyzes the Court’s application of RFRA’s strict scrutiny 
language. The Court held that promoting contraceptive access for women could be 
a compelling interest, but the ACA’s contraceptive mandate as applied to for-profit 
corporations was not the least restrictive means of achieving that interest. 
Although there is some language in the majority opinion that can be read broadly, 
ultimately the opinion—especially Justice Kennedy’s concurrence—is a limited, 
fact-specific accommodation, whose extension beyond the contraceptive mandate 
is questionable. The burden on religious employers is lessened, while female 
employees still receive coverage at no greater cost.22 It is a win-win solution, and a 
good illustration of how careful use of RFRA can advance legal goals while 
reducing the burden they place on religious believers.23 
Part VII concludes. The fact that this limited and compelling 
accommodation has stirred such outrage illustrates that many contemporary 
liberals no longer support vigorous application of religious liberty. This may be 
explained by a change in political alignment and an analysis of who stands to gain 
from religious liberty laws like RFRA. In RFRA’s foundational cases, the 
plaintiffs were generally members of nonmainstream religious groups operating in 
a society that was often unwilling to take their beliefs seriously. Liberals saw 
protecting them as part of their mission of protecting underdogs and promoting a 
diverse society. However, liberals have recently won some significant battles in 
the “culture wars,” and more mainstream conservative religious groups are looking 
to use RFRA to put some limits on the resulting statutes. Many liberals do not 
sympathize with this use of RFRA, and fear the role of still powerful conservative 
religious groups who continue to try to restrict the liberties of those whom their 
religion condemns.24 Combined with populist distrust of corporations, they see the 
Court in Hobby Lobby as going wrong in all sorts of ways. That is a shame. RFRA 
could provide a useful safety valve in the culture wars, serving as a way to protect 
some of the interests of traditionalist religious groups while still preserving the 
                                                                                                                
 19. See infra notes 183–86 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra notes 188–93 and accompanying text. 
 21. See infra notes 191–93 and accompanying text. 
 22. See infra notes 221–24 and accompanying text. 
 23. It is true that the Court holds open the possibility that this accommodation 
itself may violate RFRA. Should the Court in future cases hold that it does, in a way that is 
not trivial and easy-to-correct, the Court will have pulled a bait and switch, which could 
undermine much of the attraction of the Hobby Lobby opinion. However, the Court has not 
yet done so, and there is much reason to hope that it will not. See infra notes 224–29 and 
accompanying text. 
 24. See Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 839, 878–79. One part of this may be that many liberals were never all that devoted 
to the abstract principle of religious liberty in the first place, and when that principle ceased 
to be politically useful for them, they abandoned it. The same is true in reverse on the 
conservative side, illustrating that devotion to abstract principles of political theory is likely 
not a central motivating factor for most human beings. 
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goals of important statutes. Preserving space for diverse beliefs and practices while 
advocating a vision of the corporation that stresses their use for social purposes 
sounds like a set of principles that liberals should find inspiring. It is too bad that 
political polarization and a tribal sense of politics has prevented so many from 
appreciating what the Court has done. 
I. LEGAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The Free Exercise Clause was incorporated against the states in 1940,25 
and after that, federal courts began to hear more cases in the area. It became 
increasingly important to determine the scope of the beliefs and behavior that the 
Clause protects. Clearly, statutes that explicitly discriminate or regulate religious 
practices were covered by the Clause. It was also possible that the Clause would 
apply to a statute that on its face said nothing about religion but was enacted with 
the clear intent to discriminate against the beliefs of a religion.26 But, what of cases 
that involved a statute of general applicability that did not facially regulate religion 
and was not intended to discriminate against any religion, but as applied, would 
force members of a religion to behave in a way that violated significant religious 
beliefs? Does the Free Exercise Clause provide any protection of religious 
believers in such cases? 
The traditional answer was no.27 However, beginning with Sherbert v. 
Verner28 in 1963, the Court began to apply the Free Exercise Clause in such 
circumstances. Sherbert involved a Seventh Day Adventist who refused to work on 
Saturdays (the Sabbath for that religion), was fired, and was denied unemployment 
compensation. In an opinion by Justice Brennan, the Court held that if a facially 
neutral statute imposed a substantial burden on genuinely held religious beliefs, 
that application of the statute was invalid unless it could be shown to be the least 
restrictive means to achieve a compelling governmental interest. The least 
restrictive means/compelling interest standard is used in a variety of areas of 
constitutional law, and is commonly called “strict scrutiny,” although there is 
much room to doubt whether the Court applied strict scrutiny in the same way in 
this context compared with others.29 With Sherbert, the Court recognized that the 
Free Exercise Clause protects not just the ability to hold and proclaim religious 
beliefs, but also the ability to act upon those beliefs. 
After Sherbert, the Court followed a somewhat wobbly path in applying 
the Sherbert test. In several other cases, it used the test to strike down the 
application of a statute, most famously in Wisconsin v. Yoder,30 where the Court 
held that Amish youth could not be required to attend school until they were 
                                                                                                                
 25. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
 26. Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209, 213 (1994). 
 27. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878); Ira C. Lupu, Of Time 
and the RFRA: A Lawyers’ Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 56 MONT. L. 
REV. 171, 176 (1995). 
 28. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 29. Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA 
L. REV. 1465, 1498–1501 (1999). 
 30. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
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sixteen. In some cases, however, the plaintiffs’ claims failed.31 In certain of those 
cases, the Court held that the statute in question did not substantially burden the 
plaintiffs’ religious exercise.32 Yet in others, it held that strict scrutiny did not 
apply within a certain class of regulation, notably the military.33 And still in others, 
it applied strict scrutiny but held that the application of the law withstood that 
scrutiny.34 Nonetheless, for several decades the Sherbert test provided potent 
protection of religious liberty. 
That changed in 1990 with Employment Division, Department of Human 
Resources of Oregon v. Smith.35 In that case, the Court effectively overturned the 
Sherbert test. In a blatantly forced and misleading interpretation of the post-
Sherbert case law, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion searched for ways to interpret 
away every case that seemed to be applying Sherbert’s test, ultimately denying 
that any such test ever really existed. More plausibly, Justice Scalia warned that 
general application of the Sherbert test threatened the rule of law, and was suspect 
under the Establishment Clause. Given the incredibly wide range of modern 
statutes affecting almost every area of life, and the broad array of religious beliefs 
in the United States, it will frequently happen that someone’s religious beliefs are 
substantially burdened by a statute. Were the Court to apply a stringent test in all 
such instances, it would frequently hold that statutes do not apply to particular 
religious groups. This would leave statutes riddled with holes, and risk benefiting 
the groups who are able to claim special accommodations based on their religion.36 
Given the subsequent politics of RFRA, it is worth noting that the author of the 
opinion in Smith was Justice Scalia, the intellectual leader of the Court’s 
conservatives and someone very publicly guided by his Catholic faith. The three 
dissenters in Smith were Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall37—three of the 
most liberal justices in the history of the Supreme Court. 
Given the politics currently surrounding RFRA, it should come as little 
surprise that many religious organizations objected to the decision in Smith. It is 
more surprising that many liberal civil rights organizations objected as well—the 
ACLU, Americans United for the Separation of Church and State, People for the 
American Way, and Americans for Democratic Action came together in a 
powerful coalition that proposed a statutory overturning of Smith.38 In 1993 this 
coalition succeeded.39 RFRA passed 97–3 in the Senate (where Ted Kennedy 
joined Orrin Hatch as the lead sponsor), and unanimously in the House. That is not 
a typo. Notably, Democrats controlled both houses at the time, and President Bill 
Clinton signed RFRA into law.40 Thus, at the Court, in Congress, and in the White 
                                                                                                                
 31. See Lupu, supra note 27, at 176–85. 
 32. E.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986). 
 33. E.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). 
 34. E.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982). 
 35. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 36. Id. at 885. 
 37. Id. at 907 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 38. See Laycock & Thomas, supra note 26, at 210 n.9. 
 39.  Id. at 210. 
 40. Id. at 209. 
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House, a large number of liberals supported the principle of religious liberty 
embodied in RFRA. 
RFRA was intended to reverse Smith and reinstate the Sherbert test41—
although there is debate as to whether it actually did so, or went further. The 
statute provides that “Government shall not substantially burden a person’s 
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, 
except as provided in subsection (b).”42 Subsection (b) then uses the strict scrutiny 
language: “Government may burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it 
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person (1) furthers a compelling 
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that 
compelling governmental interest.”43 
RFRA explicitly applied to state and federal laws. However, the Supreme 
Court held that Congress did not have the authority to apply RFRA to state laws, 
so only the application to federal law remains.44 In response, some states have 
enacted RFRA to apply to their own laws, and in others, the state supreme court 
has interpreted the state constitution as imposing the Sherbert test or something 
similar.45 
As was the case with Sherbert, many questions remain as to how far 
RFRA’s protections extend. That brings us to the Hobby Lobby decision, which 
poses some of those questions. The case concerns a specific provision of the 
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), often called Obamacare. The ACA requires 
employers with 50 or more full-time employees to offer health insurance that 
meets certain minimum coverage standards, including preventive care for women. 
The Health Resources and Services Administration (“HRSA”) was charged with 
defining the preventive care standards. HRSA’s guidelines provide that preventive 
services include all FDA-approved contraceptive methods.46 
Here is where conflict arises: Several FDA-approved contraceptive 
methods work in part by preventing fertilized eggs from developing, and, 
according to some religious beliefs, that is a morally-prohibited taking of human 
life.47 The Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) addressed the 
resulting conflict with a pair of exemptions. One of these exempted religious 
employers, including churches, from the requirement completely.48 Other religious 
nonprofit organizations received a somewhat more complicated accommodation. If 
                                                                                                                
 41. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4)–(5). 
 42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a). 
 43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b). 
 44. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). 
 45. As of 2010, sixteen states had enacted a “baby RFRA” statute; other states 
have constitutional protections that state courts have interpreted along the lines of Sherbert. 
Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. 
REV. 466, 479 (2010). The Baptist Joint Committee for Religious Liberty says there are now 
21 states with state RFRAs. Don Byrd, State RFRA Bill Tracker, THE BAPTIST JOINT COMM. 
FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.bjconline.org/state-rfra-tracker-2015/. 
 46. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762 (2014). 
 47. Laycock, supra note 24, at 853 n.81. 
 48. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2763. 
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an organization that fits within the terms of this accommodation objects to the 
contraceptive mandate, it may notify its insurer. That insurer must then separately 
pay to provide contraceptive services to the employees of the religious nonprofit. 
That may seem harsh for the insurers, but HHS has determined that the costs of 
providing contraceptives is balanced out by savings from the reduction of 
pregnancy-related expenses that follow.49 
Most employers, being neither churches nor religious nonprofits, do not 
benefit from either of these accommodations, however, and many sued under 
RFRA. Two cases were consolidated for the hearing before the Supreme Court. 
One of these involved Conestoga Wood Specialties,50 a woodworking business 
owned by the Hahn family—two parents and their three children who are devout 
members of the Mennonite Church. Conestoga Wood is a for-profit corporation 
incorporated under Pennsylvania law. In addition to owning all shares, the Hahns 
control the board of directors,51 and one of the sons serves as president and CEO. 
As I will discuss below, the Hahns believed that complying with the contraceptive 
mandate would violate their religious beliefs. They pointed to the company’s 
Vision and Values Statement and to a board-adopted Statement on the Sanctity of 
Human Life as evidence that they had incorporated those religious beliefs into 
their business. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania denied the requested preliminary injunction, and the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that for-profit corporations are not able to sue 
under RFRA.  
The other case before the Supreme Court involved two corporations 
owned by the Green family, also two parents and their three children, and also 
devout Christians.52 One of the corporations was Hobby Lobby, a large chain of 
arts and crafts stores with 500 stores and over 13,000 employees. The other 
corporation, Mardel, is a chain of 35 Christian bookstores. Both companies are for-
profit corporations incorporated in Oklahoma. The Green family controls all 
shares53 and its members serve as directors and top officers. As with Conestoga, 
and again to be explored further below, the Greens pointed to various corporate 
statements and practices to show that they had incorporated their religious beliefs 
                                                                                                                
 49. Id. 
 50. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t Health & Human 
Servs., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 51. They at least control the board in the sense that collectively they own all of 
the shares, and thus can determine who will be on the board as long as they vote together, 
which they appear to have done from what one can glean from the facts presented (anyone 
familiar with either corporate law or families will here want to insert the caveat that family 
members do not always continue to agree on important matters). Given that one family 
member is also the CEO, it would appear that the family actively monitors the business as 
well, although the opinion does not give much detail. 
 52. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 53. The family actually owns Hobby Lobby through a trust. The five family 
members are the trustees and beneficiaries of the trust that, in turn, owns all of the shares of 
Hobby Lobby. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1284 (W.D. 
Okla. 2012). 
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into the business.54 The Greens had more success than the Hahns in the lower 
courts—they too lost in district court, but the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed, holding that for-profit corporations may sue under RFRA, and that the 
contraceptive mandate burdened the plaintiffs’ religious exercises and was not 
justified under the strict scrutiny test. 
These cases raise three questions to be explored in the next three sections: 
(1) Do for-profit corporations ever have standing to sue under RFRA (and, if so, 
when)?; (2) Does the contraceptive mandate substantially burden the free exercise 
rights of the plaintiffs?; and (3) If the answers to the previous questions are yes, 
can the mandate be justified under the strict scrutiny language of RFRA? 
The Court answered each of these questions in favor of the plaintiffs. Yes, 
for-profit corporations do, in some circumstances, have standing to sue under 
RFRA. Yes, the contraceptive mandate substantially burdens the free exercise 
rights of the plaintiffs. No, that mandate is not justified under strict scrutiny. 
In the next three sections, I consider in turn each of the above questions. I 
look at the Court’s legal analysis and argue that liberal unhappiness with the 
decision is mostly unjustified. 
II. RFRA AND THE DILEMMA OF FOR-PROFIT CORPORATIONS 
The gateway question, and most broadly important legal issue in Hobby 
Lobby, is whether for-profit corporations can ever sue to claim the protections of 
RFRA. And, if so, when? It is a gateway question because if the answer is no, then 
the case ends, at least as far as the corporate plaintiffs are concerned.55 This 
question is important because the Court’s answer that corporations can sue applies 
whenever a RFRA claim is asserted against the imposition of any federal statute, 
not just the ACA. There are thousands of federal statutes, and they cover just about 
every area of life and society. One cannot anticipate all of the different contexts in 
which a corporation might assert a RFRA claim. For instance, a source of anxiety 
for many has been a potential RFRA defense against employees who claim that 
their employer discriminated against them on the basis of sexual orientation. This 
concern is rather speculative, given that sexual orientation is not a protected 
category under Title VII, and the Employment Non-Discrimination Act,56 which 
would add sexual orientation to the list, does not have a realistic prospect of 
passage anytime soon.57 Note also that this gateway question is actually two 
                                                                                                                
 54.  See Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Law and Theory in Hobby Lobby, in THE 
RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 4 (Zoë Robinson et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 
2015), http://www.papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2609585. 
 55. There is the possibility that the controlling family members could have 
standing to sue as shareholders, directors, or officers. The issue is important and related, but 
for simplicity’s sake I will not address it. Because both the Court and I say that corporations 
have standing to invoke RFRA in appropriate circumstances, the alternative of standing for 
individual persons within the corporation becomes less crucial. 
 56. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, H.R. 1755, S. 815, 113th 
Cong. (2013). 
 57. Conflict could arise at the state level, but only in a state that has both a 
statute forbidding discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and a state version of 
RFRA. There are not many such states, and those states are not bound by the Supreme 
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questions: Can for-profit corporations sue under RFRA at all? And, if so, when can 
they?58 This section frames these questions and presents the two leading arguments 
against allowing for-profit corporations to sue under RFRA. The next section 
responds to those two arguments and presents a framework for analyzing when 
corporations should be able to sue for protection under RFRA—as indeed liberal 
and progressive principles of corporate law suggest they should be able to do. 
Analysis of this corporate standing issue begins with the text of RFRA. 
The core text of interest to this portion of our analysis is “Government shall not 
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from 
a rule of general applicability.”59 The issue then becomes whether corporations are 
persons for the purpose of this statute, and more particularly, are they persons 
capable of exercising religion? If so, when can we say that a particular corporation 
is exercising religion? 
The term “person” is not defined within RFRA itself. As a result, Justice 
Alito’s majority opinion starts its analysis of the term by looking to the Dictionary 
Act, which defines the word “person” as used in federal statutes generally.60 Under 
that Act, “the wor[d] ‘person’ . . . include[s] corporations, companies, associations, 
firms, partnerships, society, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.”61 
The context of a particular statute may indicate otherwise, but this is the starting 
point. That starting point accords well with general common law and corporate 
law, which treat corporations as persons for a host of legal issues, such as the 
ability to enter into contracts or to sue and be sued.62 
That is the starting point, but we are very far from being finished. Is there 
something about the context of RFRA that dictates corporations should not be 
treated as persons? Or, even if corporations are persons under RFRA, does it make 
sense to say that they are capable of exercising religion? Common sense might 
answer no to the latter question. How can a legal entity, with no body or mind of 
its own, have, or act, upon religious beliefs? The thought seems comically absurd, 
to the benefit of writers for left-of-center comics.63 
To answer this question in a nonhumorous (but one hopes not humorless) 
way, we must consider RFRA’s context. RFRA was enacted to protect religious 
liberty rights, and should be understood in the context of the Free Exercise Clause, 
particularly as interpreted in the pre-Smith case law that RFRA was intended to 
                                                                                                                
Court’s interpretation of the federal RFRA when it comes to interpreting their own state 
statute. 
 58. For convenience, I refer to both of these closely related questions as the 
corporate standing question. Context should make clear which of the two I am discussing 
where the distinction matters. 
 59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (emphasis added). 
 60. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014). 
 61. 1 U.S.C. § 1. 
 62. ERIC ORTS, BUSINESS PERSONS: A LEGAL THEORY OF THE FIRM (2013). 
 63. See, e.g., Janet Allon, WATCH: Jon Stewart Mocks the Hobby Lobby Ruling 
that Corporations Are People, ALTERNET (July 13, 2014), 
http://www.alternet.org/video/watch-jon-stewart-mocks-hobby-lobby-ruling-corporations-
are-people; Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Hobby Lobby (HBO), YOUTUBE (June 30, 
2014), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zSQCH1qyIDo. 
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resurrect.64 The majority and dissent in Hobby Lobby have some back and forth as 
to what the pre-Smith case law says about for-profit corporations exercising 
religion,65 with particular focus on the various opinions in Gallagher v. Crown 
Kosher Super Market of Massachusetts, Inc.66  
One must then ask whether granting for-profit corporations RFRA rights 
fits with the general purposes of RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause. The Court 
recognizes that corporations have constitutional rights in a variety of contexts, 
notably the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment.67 The Court does so 
because individuals often exercise their rights collectively in organizations, 
including corporations. Protecting such corporations helps protect the individuals 
involved in them. 
The exercise of religion is sometimes done in collective organizations as 
well. The most obvious example is churches, which are often legally organized as 
nonprofit corporations. Both First Amendment and RFRA case law recognize that 
such organizations have protected rights.68 One might try to limit such rights only 
to organizations like churches that are specifically and exclusively dedicated to 
religious worship. However, what of nonprofit corporations that are clearly tied to 
a particular religious group while advancing some of that group’s religiously 
motivated beliefs by providing services such as schooling, health care, or 
charitable giving? It seems pretty widely recognized that such nonprofit 
corporations should also be seen as having free exercise rights.69 
Does involvement in commercial, for-profit business then put one outside 
the protections of the Free Exercise clause and RFRA? Justice Alito’s opinion 
points out that the Court had already decided it does not. This opinion points to 
several Free Exercise cases in which the Court considered the rights of individual 
business persons.70 Although in some cases the plaintiffs ultimately lost, the Court 
nonetheless recognized their standing to make a claim—simply holding that the 
law withstood strict scrutiny.71 
Thus, our question has become more focused. If nonprofit corporations 
can claim RFRA protection, and individuals engaged in for-profit businesses can 
                                                                                                                
 64. See supra notes 27–40 and accompanying text. 
 65. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2772–73, 2794. 
 66. 366 U.S. 617 (1961). I would summarize the result of that back and forth as 
follows: the pre-Smith case law contains no definitive holding either that for-profit 
corporations can exercise protected Free Exercise rights or that they cannot. The majority 
and dissent draw different inferences as to the implications of this silence for interpreting 
RFRA. I do not think that an inference from silence in either direction is very strong or 
persuasive. 
 67. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); 
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 68. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 
(2006); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 69. As indeed was done with the contraceptive mandate itself. See supra notes 
46–49 and accompanying text. 
 70. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2769–70 (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 
(1961); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982)).  
 71. Id.  
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as well, is there anything about the for-profit corporation that categorically 
excludes it from claiming RFRA protection? 
There are two leading reasons that individuals use to argue that for-profit 
corporations are indeed special such that RFRA should never protect them. I think 
that both reasons are wrong. However, in exploring them, we will not only be 
answering critics of this portion of the Hobby Lobby opinion, but also gaining 
insight into both why for-profit corporations should be able to claim RFRA rights 
and, just as importantly, when they should be able to do so.72 So let us first see 
those two leading arguments against RFRA standing for for-profit corporations, 
and then move on to why those arguments are wrong. 
The first argument against RFRA protecting for-profit corporations arises 
from a particular understanding of the fiduciary duty of corporate directors and 
officers. Under this argument, officers owe a duty to corporate shareholders, and 
the only allowable goal of the corporation is to maximize the financial return that 
shareholders receive. Let us call this the “shareholder conception” of the 
corporation (which we shall soon contrast with the “stakeholder conception”). The 
locus classicus for legal articulations of the shareholder conception of the 
corporation is the old case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Corporation.73 Recent cases 
that describe the shareholder conception of the corporation include Revlon, Inc. v. 
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.74 and eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. 
Newmark.75 A number of scholars agree with this view of the purpose of the 
corporation.76 
If a strong version of the shareholder conception is correct, it might 
explain why for-profit corporations are critically different from both nonprofit 
corporations and unincorporated for-profit businesses. Nonprofit corporations are 
allowed to have a wide range of purposes, including religious purposes. For-profit 
corporations are allowed just one purpose, maximizing returns to shareholders. 
This leaves no room for any other goals, including religious goals. As for 
unincorporated for-profit businesses, it is true that persons engaged in such 
businesses pursue profit. However, no legal duty requires them to only pursue 
profit. They can pursue other goals, including religious goals, along with profit. 
They may put religion over profit whenever the two conflict if they so desire. That 
is not true in for-profit corporations, where placing religion over profit would 
                                                                                                                
 72. Thus, the analysis will help answer both questions linked together under the 
concept of corporate standing. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 73. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
 74. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). The scope of circumstances in which the Revlon 
duties apply has become quite narrow. See Lyman Johnson, The Dwindling of Revlon, 71 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 167 (2014). 
 75. 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 76. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 36 (1991); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The 
Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 547 (2003); Jonathan R. 
Macey, Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to Nonshareholder 
Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1266 (1999). 
For an overview, see David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 
1013 (2013). 
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violate the fiduciary duties owed to shareholders. Thus, it can make no legal sense 
to say that a for-profit corporation has any sort of religious value as a defining 
goal.77 
Before responding to the shareholder conception, let us consider the other 
leading corporate law argument for denying RFRA standing to for-profit 
corporations. This is the argument from corporate personhood, articulated by a 
number of prominent corporate law scholars in an amicus brief to the Supreme 
Court in Hobby Lobby.78 The scholars argue that the corporations in Hobby Lobby 
are trying to pass through the religious beliefs of their shareholders to the 
corporation itself. However, one of the characteristics of a corporation is that it is 
legally distinct from its shareholders. Shareholders are not responsible for the 
liabilities of the corporation—one of the key benefits of the corporate form.79 By 
attributing the shareholders’ religious beliefs to the corporation, scholars argue, 
shareholders want the benefits that a separate legal personality provides through 
limited liability while ignoring that separate personality when seeking the 
protection of RFRA.80 
III. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING RFRA STANDING 
Now we turn to what is wrong with these two arguments. This will lead 
us to both a core liberal principle underlying the Hobby Lobby decision and a 
framework for determining when corporations should be able to invoke RFRA 
protection. Opposing the shareholder conception of corporate purpose and duty is a 
liberal and progressive stakeholder vision of corporations as vehicles for pursuing 
a variety of public goods while still achieving a return for shareholders. Opposing 
the argument based on corporate personality, we will see that, although the 
premise of a legal separation between the shareholders and the corporation is 
completely correct, the conclusion that corporations cannot be vehicles for 
pursuing religious purposes does not follow at all. The proposed framework for 
analyzing RFRA standing has two dimensions. The first, and more important 
dimension looks at the various degrees and forms of organizational commitment to 
a religious purpose. The second dimension considers how the extent of 
shareholding concentration in a limited number of shareholders with religious 
commitments can also affect the analysis. Variations along each dimension can be 
more or less supportive of RFRA standing, with the analysis being easy where 
both dimensions either strongly support or discourage standing, and more difficult 
where the dimensions are at cross purposes. 
                                                                                                                
 77. Some judges in the lower court cases made this argument. See Conestoga 
Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 
385, (3d Cir. 2013); Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618, 626 (6th Cir. 2013). 
 78. Brief for Corporate and Criminal Law Professors as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (Nos. 
13-354, 13-356), 2014 WL 333889, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs-
v3/13-354-13-356_amcu_cclp.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter Amicus Brief]. 
 79. Id. at 6–8. 
 80. Id. at 13–16. 
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Let us start with the shareholder conception of the corporation and its 
fiduciary duty argument. First, even if one accepts that there is an immutable 
fiduciary duty to solely maximize shareholder returns, that need not necessarily 
rule out other goals as important subsidiary purposes of a corporation. There are 
many different ways to achieve the end of maximizing financial returns. In the vast 
majority of real world situations, spotting a sharp conflict between profit 
maximization and other plausible goals is nearly impossible because figuring out 
what profit maximization entails is extraordinarily complicated and subject to 
differing opinions. Recognizing this, courts use the business judgment rule 
(acknowledged even in Dodge)81 to give boards much latitude in determining how 
best to maximize profit.82 For instance, many believe that had Henry Ford simply 
said he was giving his workers high wages as a way of maintaining loyalty and 
high productivity, rather than explicitly saying he was ignoring profits in doing so, 
the court would not have second-guessed his judgment.83 
Similarly, for some corporations a religious goal and reputation might be 
good business. If Hobby Lobby has deeply branded itself as a religious 
corporation, it could well justify a decision that follows religious precepts by 
sacrificing short-term profits. Such a decision may increase long-term profitability 
by making its employees and customers more loyal. It may not, of course, but 
courts applying the business judgment rule would defer to the judgment of the 
directors and officers. For such a corporation, it might be the case that its religious 
goal is strong and entrenched enough to grant it standing under RFRA. After all, if 
that goal succeeds, it does so by attracting religiously minded employees, 
consumers, and investors, inducing them to get involved with the corporation. It is 
precisely such collective involvement with a shared religious purpose that the 
extension of RFRA to organizations is intended to protect.84 
But the fiduciary duty objection is more wrong than that. It seems highly 
unlikely that the duty to maximize shareholder returns is immutable. If 
shareholders agree to follow legally recognized methods, they should be able to 
waive that duty and allow their corporation to pursue other goals potentially at 
odds with maximizing profits. A core principle of American corporate law is that 
most of its rules are defaults, which the corporation may opt out of when the 
appropriate approval is received.85 Shareholders should be able to opt out of the 
alleged duty by agreeing to a provision in the charter, bylaw, or shareholder 
                                                                                                                
 81.  Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 682 (Mich. 1919). 
 82. See Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Fiduciary Duties: The Emerging 
Jurisprudence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 133, 135–
37 (2012); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 83 (2004).  
 83. M. Todd Henderson, Everything Old Is New Again: Lessons from Dodge v. 
Ford Motor Company (Univ. of Chi. Law & Econs. Olin Working Paper No. 373, 2007), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1070284. 
 84. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014). 
 85. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 76; ROBERTA ROMANO, THE 
GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993); Alan J. Meese & Nathan B. Oman, Hobby 
Lobby, Corporate Law, and the Theory of the Firm: Why For-Profit Corporations Are 
RFRA Persons, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 273, 277 (2014). 
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agreement.86 Thus, a corporation that has adopted a charter provision stating that it 
has as a core purpose87 to pursue Christian values would presumably be a prime 
candidate for RFRA protection. 
But we have still not plumbed the depth of error in the fiduciary duty 
objection. The previous paragraph suggested that corporations may deviate from 
the exclusive focus on shareholder wealth only if shareholders approve. Many, 
including myself, do not believe that is a correct characterization.88 We believe 
that boards may validly consider and advance the interests of a variety of persons 
associated with a corporation, including its employees, creditors, customers, and 
suppliers—even if those interests lead to a reduction in profits. Moreover, 
shareholders themselves may have interests other than maximizing their own 
financial returns, and may want corporations in which they have invested to pursue 
other goals.89 This is the stakeholder conception of the corporation, and is often 
associated with those who are on the more liberal or progressive end of the 
political spectrum.90 Here is where we see the first major liberal value embedded 
within the Hobby Lobby decision.91 
                                                                                                                
 86. Meese & Oman, supra note 85, at 281–83. 
 87. I say “a core purpose,” not “its sole purpose.” Any for-profit corporation will 
have as one of its purposes achieving a financial return for its shareholders. If it has no 
intent to return any money at all to its shareholders, it can and should organize as a 
nonprofit corporation or some other sort of entity. 
 88. See Lee, supra note 13; LYNN A. STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: 
HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATION, AND THE PUBLIC 
(2012); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 
85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999); Lyman Johnson, Law and Legal Theory in the History of 
Corporate Responsibility: Corporate Personhood, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1135 (2012); 
Johnson & Millon, supra note 12; McDonnell, supra note 12; David Millon, Two Model of 
Corporate Social Responsibility, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 523 (2011). 
 89. See Anne Tucker, The Citizen Shareholder: Modernizing the Agency 
Paradigm to Reflect How and Why a Majority of Americans Invest in the Market, 35 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1299, 1318 n.85 (2012). 
 90. PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, supra note 12. Several decades ago, a 
leading practical expression of this viewpoint was the creation of corporate constituency 
statutes, which explicitly allow corporations to pursue goals other than shareholder wealth 
maximization. See Brett H. McDonnell, Corporate Constituency Statutes and Employee 
Governance, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1227 (2004); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical 
and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 
579 (1992); Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency 
Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14 (1992). Another practical expression has been the 
movement to encourage corporations to behave in socially responsible ways. A very recent 
practical expression is the creation of benefit corporation statutes, in which corporations can 
affirmatively commit to pursuing goals other than shareholder wealth maximization. See 
Brett H. McDonnell, Committing to Doing Good and Doing Well: Fiduciary Duty in Benefit 
Corporations, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 19 (2014); Lyman Johnson, Pluralism in 
Corporate Form: Corporate Law and Benefit Corps., 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 269, 279 
(2012–2013); Mark J. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge in Corporate 
Governance, 68 BUS. LAW. 1007, 1021–22 (2013); William H. Clark, Jr. et al., White 
Paper: The Need and Rationale for the Benefit Corporation: Why It Is the Legal Form that 
Best Addresses the Need of Social Entrepreneurs, Investors, and, Ultimately, the Public (on 
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Scholars have endlessly debated whether the stakeholder or shareholder 
conception of the corporation better characterizes American corporate law. As to 
the leading state, Delaware, Christopher Bruner’s take on the enduring 
ambivalence of Delaware on this point is persuasive.92 That is, Delaware case law 
vacillates between the shareholder and stakeholder conceptions, with proponents 
of each side able to quote authority in their favor.93 But over half of the states have 
adopted a corporate constituency statute, which explicitly allows directors to 
consider the interests of enumerated stakeholders.94 Although a cramped reading of 
these statutes is conceivable, it seems pretty clear that in these states the 
stakeholder conception has triumphed. 
Shortly, I shall argue that it has triumphed in Justice Alito’s majority 
opinion as well. If one accepts the stakeholder conception of the corporation, then 
the fiduciary duty objection to RFRA standing collapses completely. No sort of 
duty requires those acting on behalf of corporations to pursue shareholder wealth 
maximization as their only goal. Moreover, if this conception is right, it should 
lead courts to recognize corporations as adopting a religious purpose more readily 
than if one prefers the previous responses to the duty objection. There is no need to 
point to any sort of potential long-term benefit to shareholders in justifying the 
religious goal. Nor is there any need to show that shareholders have formally 
approved the shareholder goal. Moreover, the analysis is not limited to closely held 
corporations—public corporations are also allowed to pursue goals other than 
shareholder wealth maximization. There is still the question of determining when a 
corporation has actually adopted such a goal, but a broad array of indicators may 
point to the conclusion that it has done so. We shall explore these soon. 
But first, let us consider the flaws in the argument against RFRA standing 
based on separate corporate personality.95 A limited response to this is that 
occasionally corporate law disregards the separation between the shareholders and 
the corporation. When a court does so, it is said to have pierced the corporate veil. 
Courts pierce the veil where one or a few shareholders totally dominate a 
corporation, and where they have abused the corporate form in a way that unfairly 
hurts others. When this happens, the court ignores the usual rule of limited 
liability, and allows creditors of the corporation to collect unpaid debts from the 
controlling shareholder.96 
                                                                                                                
file with author). It is notable that the Court cites the example of benefit corporations to 
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 92. Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 59 
ALA. L. REV. 1385 (2008). 
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 94. McDonnell, supra note 90; Orts, supra note 90; Mitchell, supra note 90. 
 95. See Amicus Brief, supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text. 
 96. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479, 
481 (2001); John H. Matheson, Why Courts Pierce: An Empirical Study of Piercing the 
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With RFRA, one might on occasion decide to pierce in the opposite 
direction. That is, instead of allowing creditors to treat a debt that belongs to the 
corporation as belonging to its shareholders as well, one might attribute a free 
exercise right that belongs to the shareholders as belonging to the corporation. One 
would do so only in the rare circumstances where there are a very few shareholders 
who are fully identified with the corporation itself. Indeed, there are a few 
instances outside of RFRA where courts have engaged in such “reverse veil-
piercing.”97 Stephen Bainbridge has argued for using reverse veil-piercing in the 
RFRA context.98 The corporate law scholars who wrote the amicus brief think that 
veil-piercing is inappropriate.99 Bainbridge is seemingly right in stating that we 
disregard corporate personality on occasion, but it is rare. If this were the only 
response to the corporate personhood argument, it would lead to recognizing 
corporate standing under RFRA in only a few extreme cases. 
But, there is a much more robust response to the argument. Corporate 
personhood is not really an argument that corporations cannot have a religious 
purpose. Rather, it is an argument against inferring such a purpose from the 
individual beliefs of its shareholders. Doing so misconceives the relationship 
between shareholders and corporations. But, recognizing the importance of 
separate corporate personality in no way rules out the possibility that a religious 
purpose may be inferred via other means. In particular, the body that has most 
authority to make decisions and determine corporate strategies and purposes is the 
board of directors.100 Should the board choose to declare the religious purpose of a 
corporation, nothing at all in the argument from corporate personality would seem 
to argue against recognizing that board declaration. 
Pulling the discussion of fiduciary duty and corporate personality 
together, the best articulation of a theory of corporations that fits within a liberal or 
progressive vision is probably the team production model of Margaret Blair and 
Lynn Stout.101 Under this theory, the board acts as a mediating hierarch that guides 
the general direction of the corporation, taking into account the shared and 
competing interests of a variety of groups that contribute resources to the 
corporation. The board’s fiduciary duty does not focus exclusively on maximizing 
shareholder wealth. The corporation is indeed quite separate from shareholders, 
and it is the board that makes the big policy decisions that define the corporation. 
Is there no way in which shareholders are singled out, given that they do 
elect the board, and have a few other important powers, such as approving charter 
amendments, the ability to amend the bylaws on their own, and the ability to enter 
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into shareholder agreements that can bind the corporation? Here, I may deviate a 
bit from the pure team production theory, which goes pretty far in trying to 
minimize the import of the shareholder role.102 Those just-mentioned shareholder 
powers are significant and go beyond what other constituent groups, such as 
creditors and employees, have. In fact, in closely held corporations—not the 
intended subject for the team production theory103—those powers often mean that 
a few shareholders have full control over the corporation, particularly because the 
same shareholders typically serve as directors and officers as well. Thus, although 
one should focus on the actions and statements of the board to determine a 
corporation’s purpose, the shareholders (and officers) may matter as well—
especially in closely held corporations. A corporation with just a few related 
shareholders who are deeply committed to the same religious beliefs may well be 
more deeply and effectively committed to a religious purpose than an otherwise 
similar corporation with a more divided and diluted group of shareholders. 
This theory of the goals and power structure of corporations should be 
agreeable to liberals for a few reasons. It allows corporations to pursue a wide 
variety of goals, creating space for corporations to engage in socially responsible 
behavior. It also deemphasizes the importance and authority of shareholders and 
puts more focus on the role of other groups (such as employees) and, insofar as 
liberals tend to champion those with relatively less wealth and power, liberal 
sympathy tends to lie with some of those groups.104 
Next, I shall propose a suggested framework for determining whether a 
corporation should have standing under RFRA. Then, I shall compare that 
framework with what the Court says in Hobby Lobby. 
Consider two dimensions of religious commitment by a corporation: 
organizational and ownership. The more important dimension focuses on 
organizational rules and practices.105 Consistent with the basic structure of 
corporate law, the board is primarily responsible for these rules and practices, 
although officers may determine some of them (subject to the board’s oversight 
and approval). A few of the most formal and foundational rules are subject to 
shareholder approval. 
Organizational rules and practices can be more or less authoritative and 
controlling. The most authoritative rule would be a provision in the corporate 
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charter, which must be approved by both the board and shareholders.106 Slightly 
less authoritative would be a provision in the bylaws, which may be approved by 
either the board or the shareholders on their own.107 Shareholders may also enter 
into agreements that can bind the corporation.108 These are the three main formal 
powers that shareholders have that are relevant for setting corporate policy, beyond 
electing the board. Recall that on some conceptions of corporate duty and purpose, 
formal shareholder approval is required to deviate from the shareholder wealth 
maximization default, so that only these sorts of rules would suffice to establish a 
religious purpose.109 
A broader stakeholder theory of the corporation does not require such 
formal shareholder approval, and, thus, other sorts of rules and practices may be 
enough to establish a religious purpose. Boards may adopt policy or value 
statements that proclaim a corporation’s commitment to religious values. Their 
choice of goods or services produced or sold (or not sold) may deliberately reflect 
religious values. They may enter into agreements that commit them to courses of 
action or constraints that reflect religious values. They may make charitable 
commitments that reflect their values. They may market themselves to consumers, 
employees, and/or investors based on their religious values. They may make 
formal disclosures or more informal public statements proclaiming their values. 
And so on. There is obviously a rich array of possibilities. For any particular 
corporation, one can consider the totality of circumstances and ask how firmly, 
formally, broadly, and pervasively that corporation has used this array of methods 
to proclaim and commit to a set of religious values. 
Ownership is the other dimension of corporate religious commitment. It is 
less important than the organizational dimension, but it does matter given the role 
of shareholders within the corporation, including both their position as the body 
that elects the board and their role in amendments to the charter and bylaws.110 
There are several factors that will drive how strongly committed the shareholders 
are to a religious purpose. One factor is the sincerity and strength of the religious 
commitment of individual shareholders. Another factor is the degree that share 
ownership is concentrated in one or a few shareholders. A corporation with just 
one or two shareholders who are deeply committed to religious values is more 
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likely to remain committed to those values. For the same reason, the total number 
of shareholders is also relevant. Another factor is to what extent a liquid market 
exists for a corporation’s shares. If there is such a market, the current shareholder 
base is more prone to turnover as time goes by, so that even if the current 
shareholders are highly religious, there is a greater chance that future shareholders 
may not be. 
Corporate law has several related but separate concepts that help 
distinguish important variations in the ownership dimension. From the veil-
piercing doctrine comes the notion of an alter ego, where one shareholder so 
dominates the corporation that there is no real distinction between that shareholder 
and the corporation.111 Moving towards a lesser degree of concentration, there is 
the notion of a controlling shareholder or controlling group.112 This occurs where 
one person or closely related group owns enough shares that they can effectively 
control the corporation; they can elect a majority of the board. Control of a 
majority of the outstanding shares is generally a sufficient but not necessary 
condition for such control. Another idea is that of a closely held corporation,113 
which the Court frequently invokes in Hobby Lobby. The idea of a closely held 
corporation is somewhat nebulous, although some states do have special rules for 
close corporations that provide a more precise legal definition.114 The two defining 
features of a closely held corporation are: (1) a relatively small number of 
shareholders and (2) no active market for the shares (indeed, those statutes which 
define close corporations typically require that shares must be subject to transfer 
restrictions).115 In contrast, shares of a public corporation are traded on a public 
market.116 Note that a closely held corporation need not have any controlling 
shareholder or group,117 while a public corporation may have a controlling 
shareholder.118 
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Let us bring together these two dimensions to suggest a framework for 
determining when a corporation should be able to claim RFRA standing. In both 
organizational and ownership dimensions, a corporation may show a stronger or 
weaker degree of commitment to a religious purpose and values. How do those 




No religious ownership 
Strong organizational 
commitment to religion 










Table 1: Framework for Determining RFRA Standing.  
Consider four extreme cases, illustrated in Table 1, depending upon 
whether each dimension shows either a quite strong or a quite weak commitment 
to a religious purpose. The best case for RFRA standing occurs where both 
dimensions show a strong commitment, as in box I of Table 1. Imagine a family 
corporation with just a few family members who own all of the shares, with no 
history or prospect of any sort of market in those shares, and where all 
shareholders have a sincere and strong commitment to the same specific religion. 
The corporation has adopted a charter provision declaring that its decisions will be 
guided by the beliefs of that religion, the corporation has repeatedly and publicly 
proclaimed this commitment in a variety of settings, the service it provides is 
closely linked to a religious identity, and, as a result of all these commitments, 
most employees and customers identify with the same religious beliefs. This is the 
strongest case for granting RFRA standing. In such a corporation, it is not just the 
shareholders who are likely to look to the corporation as a way of acting on their 
religious beliefs, but also many of the employees and customers. The commitment 
is deep and long-lasting, making it more likely that the corporation will attract 
similar believers and reducing the likelihood that it is claiming a religious purpose 
under RFRA as a deceptive way of achieving a commercial advantage. If courts 
are to grant any for-profit corporation standing under RFRA (and Hobby Lobby 
indicates they will) this is the clearest kind of example of a case where doing so 
would be appropriate. 
Consider the other end of the spectrum, a corporation with no signs of 
religious commitment on either dimension as in box IV of Table 1. Imagine a 
public corporation with no shareholder holding more than a few percentage points 
of the shares, and an active share market on the New York Stock Exchange with 
heavy turnover. No official policy, statement, or settled practice shows any sign of 
a commitment to any religious purpose. Clearly, such a corporation cannot claim 
standing under RFRA, not even if it tried to claim a sudden St. Paul conversion 
moment. 
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More interesting and difficult are the other two cases where a corporation 
shows a strong religious commitment on one dimension but not the other. Given 
that the organizational dimension is generally more important under corporate law 
and theory than the ownership dimension,119 let us turn to the case where a 
corporation has a strong commitment on the organizational dimension but not the 
ownership dimension (as in box II of Table 1). Imagine a corporation that was 
owned by a religious family in its early stages, with a religious purpose bylaw, a 
well-publicized religious vision statement, and products and policies that show a 
clear commitment to religious values. As a result, the company’s directors, 
officers, and many of its employees and customers share the founders’ strong 
religious beliefs. However, the founders recently gave up their controlling share 
position, either by selling out to a company with no religious commitment or by 
going public and selling enough shares to divest the founding family members of a 
controlling block. 
In this example, the lack of commitment in the ownership dimension does 
matter. It matters in part because it means that the shareholders themselves are not 
expressing their religious values through their involvement in the organization, so 
that is one important constituent group for which RFRA standing serves no 
purpose.120 Moreover, the ownership situation unsettles the strength of 
commitment found in the organizational dimension. If the new shareholders 
become disillusioned with the religious commitment of this corporation, they may 
replace the directors with a more secularly-minded board, which in turn may 
revoke the various statements and practices that constitute the company’s ongoing 
commitment to a religious purpose. Indeed, the rarity (perhaps complete 
nonexistence)121 of a corporation fitting this hypothetical situation suggests that 
public corporations face strong practical pressure to focus on shareholder financial 
value. 
However, that does not necessarily imply that RFRA standing is 
inappropriate in this case. If the commitments along the organizational dimension 
are strong enough, this may remain a religious enough corporation. Even if the 
shareholders are not religious, the directors, officers, employees, and customers 
are, so the religious values of many individuals are still being pursued through this 
corporation. Moreover, the commitment may remain quite strong and unlikely to 
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be changed. The shareholders may find that attacking that commitment is a 
suicidal business strategy. Insofar as the commitment is embodied in ongoing 
contracts, it may take time to be able to withdraw from them. In the case of public 
share ownership, the shareholders may well find the costs of organizing to replace 
the board prohibitive.122 Depending upon the precise facts, RFRA standing may be 
appropriate; though, where the ownership dimension is weak, one does require 
particularly strong commitment on the organizational dimension. 
Finally, consider the case where commitment is weak on the 
organizational dimension but strong in ownership. Imagine a family corporation 
owned by just a couple of committed Christian family members, whose shared 
beliefs are sincere and strong. However, they have in the past shown no particular 
religious purpose in their business, although they have not caused the business to 
behave in any way that violates their religious beliefs. Now a new law would force 
them to violate a strongly held belief. Of course, the corporation can always adopt 
a formal policy after the issue has arisen, but one should perhaps be more skeptical 
of such post hoc actions. Conestoga Wood Specialties in the Hobby Lobby case 
itself may not be too far off from this description—at least as described by the 
Supreme Court. Although its shareholder family was certainly composed of 
committed Christians, the number and formality of organizational commitments to 
a Christian purpose was pretty meager.123 Should the corporation be able to claim 
standing under RFRA? 
This is the hardest case of the four. The greater importance of the 
organizational dimension—which derives from both the stakeholder conception of 
the corporation with respect to duty124 and from a recognition of distinct corporate 
personality125—suggests not giving RFRA standing here. If these owners meant to 
use this business as a vehicle for pursuing their religious beliefs, why have they 
given no sign of it among the many sorts of practices that we consider on the 
organizational dimension? We should be able to find some degree of religious 
commitment along the organizational dimension if we are to grant RFRA standing, 
although the degree of commitment can certainly be more modest where the 
ownership dimension shows a strong commitment. 
But perhaps in rare circumstances we might want to grant RFRA standing 
to such a corporation. The rationale would be along veil-piercing lines, where we 
see the corporation as essentially an extension of the dominant owner(s).126 Even if 
such owners are not affirmatively using the business to advance their religious 
values, they may see those values as imposing strong moral constraints on what 
they are willing to do, even if in the past those constraints have not been visibly 
binding. Indeed, insofar as we encourage socially responsible corporations, we 
want to encourage owners who recognize such moral constraints on the behavior 
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of the businesses they own.127 Where the beliefs are sincere, and the burden on 
those beliefs is significant, we should be willing to consider an accommodation for 
such a corporation. But in the absence of any sort of significant commitment at the 
organizational level, this case is (at best) an extremely tenuous candidate for 
RFRA standing. Of course, once the issue has been identified, the shareholders of 
such a corporation can move to create the necessary organizational commitment, 
which could eliminate the dilemma supposed in this hypothesized situation. 
However, we may often be skeptical of such after-the-fact rationalizations, 
especially in cases (unlike Hobby Lobby, it appears) where the corporation may 
gain monetarily from seeking a religious accommodation. In such cases, a court 
could credit such belated commitments only where they appear to commit the 
corporation to profit-decreasing as well as profit-increasing actions. 
I have just suggested a framework for deciding when a corporation should 
be able to claim standing under RFRA. The guiding concept is an inquiry into the 
extent to which a corporation has committed itself, legally and practically, to a 
religious purpose that helps shape its decision-making. One should consider both 
the organizational dimension and the ownership dimension in determining a 
corporation’s degree of commitment, assigning more importance to the 
organizational dimension. This framework is grounded in corporate law and 
theory, and fits well with a perspective on corporate law that is often associated 
with political liberals or progressives. It provides more of a legal standard than a 
bright line rule, and will not always lead to clear answers. The result will depend 
upon the totality of the circumstances. However, it does identify the major factors 
one should consider, and in concert with well-understood concepts of corporate 
law, it should provide some handy guidance most of the time. 
IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S OPINION FITS WITHIN THIS 
FRAMEWORK 
To what extent does this framework reflect the approach of the Hobby 
Lobby opinion? I believe the framework fits the opinion quite well. I acknowledge 
that the fit is not perfect. The Supreme Court did not develop a full-fledged theory, 
but rather went only as far as it needed in order to address the facts in front of it. 
Even then, it may not have gone far enough. Supreme Court justices are not chosen 
for their expertise in corporate law, and it shows. The opinion is rather vague and 
imprecise, and contains elements of several different approaches to corporate law. 
In fact, a plausible claim can be made that the Court has sided with any one of 
several different understandings of corporations.128 Nonetheless, the approach 
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outlined here fits the Hobby Lobby opinion at least as well as, and probably better 
than, all competing approaches.129 
In attempting to decipher the majority opinion’s theory of the corporation, 
we should look to both its general statements of how corporations should be 
understood within RFRA, and its description of the facts surrounding the plaintiff 
corporations in Hobby Lobby itself. As to the former, there are two extended 
passages of particular note. The first states: 
Congress provided protection for people like the Hahns and Greens 
by employing a familiar legal fiction: It included corporations 
within RFRA’s definition of “persons.” But it is important to keep 
in mind that the purpose of this fiction is to provide protection for 
human beings. A corporation is simply a form of organization used 
by human beings to achieve desired ends. An established body of 
law specifies the rights and obligations of the people (including 
shareholders, officers, and employees) who are associated with a 
corporation in one way or another. When rights, whether 
constitutional or statutory, are extended to corporations, the purpose 
is to protect the rights of these people. . . protecting the free-exercise 
rights of corporations like Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel 
protects the religious liberty of the humans who own and control 
those companies.130 
When this passage speaks of the people who are associated with a 
corporation, it lists not only shareholders, but also officers and employees.131 This 
suggests more of a stakeholder conception of the corporation, not a shareholder 
conception. The end of the passage does narrow its focus to “the humans who own 
and control those companies.”132 However, that, in part, reflects the fact that the 
corporations in the case, to which the beginning of that sentence refers, are closely 
held corporations with just five shareholders, who are also the directors and 
officers. And even this narrower sentence points to those who “own and control” 
the companies, which includes directors and officers, not just shareholders. 
Immediately following this passage, the majority opinion cites the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals’s opinion below,133 which made the argument based on 
separate corporate personhood. Justice Alito replied by acknowledging the reality 
and importance of separate corporate personhood, but dismissed the argument as 
“quite beside the point,” reasoning that: “Corporations, ‘separate and apart from’ 
the human beings who own, run, and are employed by them, cannot do anything at 
all.”134 The Court thereby acknowledges the law of separate corporate personhood, 
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but says that law is used for various purposes to advance the interests of those 
involved in the corporation. In applying RFRA, the point is not to identify the 
corporation with its shareholders, but rather to determine whether granting RFRA 
standing is consistent with the goals and structure of the corporation in question. In 
pointing to the human beings who make up a corporation, the Court specifically 
mentions “the human beings who own, run, and are employed by them,”135 once 
again going well beyond shareholders. This whole passage is highly consistent 
with my response above to the argument from separate corporate personality.136 
The other general statement of note appears several pages later, and 
considers the fiduciary duty argument against RFRA standing. It too deserves 
extended quotation: 
Some lower court judges have suggested that RFRA does not 
protect for-profit corporations because the purpose of such 
corporations is simply to make money. This argument flies in the 
face of modern corporate law. “Each American jurisdiction today 
either expressly or by implication authorizes corporation to be 
formed under its general corporation act for any lawful purpose or 
business.” While it is certainly true that a central objective of for-
profit corporations is to make money, modern corporate law does 
not require for-profit corporations to pursue profit at the expense of 
everything else, and many do not do so. For-profit corporations, 
with ownership approval, support a wide variety of charitable 
causes, and it is not at all uncommon for such corporations to 
further humanitarian and other altruistic objectives. Many examples 
come readily to mind. So long as its owners agree, a for-profit 
corporation may take costly pollution-control and energy-
conservation measures that go beyond what the law requires. A for-
profit corporation that operates facilities in other countries may 
exceed the requirements of local law regarding working conditions 
and benefits. If for-profit corporations may pursue such worthy 
objectives, there is no apparent reason why they may not further 
religious objectives as well.137 
This paragraph, for the most part, works as a ringing endorsement of the 
stakeholder conception of the corporation that many liberals and progressives 
prefer. It certainly denies the existence of an immutable duty to only consider the 
financial interests of shareholders, requiring corporate directors and officers to 
justify any other sorts of goals as helping to maximize profit in the long run.138 
The passage does show some ambiguity between weaker and stronger 
understandings of the stakeholder conception.139 Recall that a weak understanding 
asserts that a profit-maximization-only goal is the default rule, and opting out of it 
requires explicit shareholder approval,140 whereas a stronger stakeholder 
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conception asserts that an exclusive focus on profit-maximization is not the default 
rule, so that shareholder approval is not required to consider other goals.141 The 
beginning and end of the quoted passage assert the validity of purposes other than 
shareholder profit without any qualifiers concerning shareholder approval, 
suggesting the stronger stakeholder conception. However, in the middle of the 
passage there are two references to “owner” approval, which could suggest a 
weaker conception. The first of those references states that “[f]or-profit 
corporations, with ownership approval, support a wide variety of charitable causes, 
and it is not at all uncommon for such corporations to further humanitarian and 
other altruistic objectives.”142 Although this passage could be read to suggest that 
ownership approval is required in order to give to charity,143 it need not be 
understood that way. The reference to ownership approval may simply be pointing 
out that in many cases the shareholders themselves are happy for the corporation to 
behave charitably, so that shareholders and the beneficiaries can both benefit. Note 
that many, probably most, corporations that engage in charitable giving do not 
obtain any sort of explicit shareholder approval, neither for specific instances of 
giving nor for the general power to give. So this example is not a very good one 
for the weak stakeholder conception (requiring explicit shareholder approval for 
nonprofit goals) as an explanation of actual corporate law and behavior. 
The second reference to shareholder approval is admittedly stronger 
evidence that the Court has in mind only the weak stakeholder conception: “So 
long as its owners agree, a for-profit corporation may take costly pollution-control 
and energy-conservation measures that go beyond what the law requires.”144 That 
“so long as” does indeed suggest that without owner approval, a for-profit 
corporation could not take such profit-reducing measures.145 However, that is only 
one sentence within the quoted passage above, and the other sentences seem to 
suggest the stronger stakeholder conception. 
More tellingly, the Court’s application of its reasoning to the facts in the 
cases before it in Hobby Lobby is more consistent with the strong than the weak 
stakeholder conception. Indeed, on the weak conception, it is not at all clear that 
the corporations behaved appropriately, or even legally, to the extent that they 
reduced profits in order to advance religious goals. For the Conestoga Wood 
Specialties Corporation, the Court points to several statements from the 
shareholders themselves, apparently prepared for trial. It also points to a company 
“Vision and Values Statement,” with no indication that the shareholders acting as 
shareholders approved the statement, and to a board-adopted “Statement on the 
Sanctity of Human Life.”146 In Hobby Lobby, there were two corporations owned 
by the same family. For these corporations, the Court points to a company 
statement of purpose, pledges signed by the family members to run the business in 
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accordance with their religious beliefs, and various religious practices adopted by 
the companies.147 
Thus, for none of the three corporations does the Court point to any action 
taken by the shareholders, while acting as shareholders and following corporate 
law procedures for shareholder action (e.g., charter amendments, bylaw 
amendments, or shareholder agreements).148 The weak stakeholder conception 
would seem to require such formal shareholder approval for a deviation from the 
profit-maximization default rule.149 Perhaps that does not matter in a case like this, 
where the roles of shareholders, directors, and officers overlap completely, and 
where it is clear that each individual shareholder does agree with the religious 
goals. As a matter of corporate law, that should not make a difference. Corporate 
law prescribes the ways in which shareholders can act where their approval is 
required for a corporate action.150 If the shareholders have not acted in such a 
legally recognized way, then the requisite approval has not been obtained.151 
It is possible that the Court holds to the weak stakeholder conception but 
was simply not aware of the need for corporate formalities. Or, perhaps the Court 
decided that for purposes of RFRA standing, it did not need to require such 
formality and could recognize the necessary shareholder approval more informally, 
since in the cases at hand, it was clear that all of the shareholders did in fact 
approve.152 But the Court gives no indication that it is introducing its own variant 
of corporate law for this particular setting. Nor would it be wise for the Court to 
stray from the requirements of state corporate law in interpreting RFRA. For one 
thing, the federal courts have no expertise in corporate law, and are unlikely to 
make sensible choices if they stray from the established state law system. More 
fundamentally, looking to state law is the conceptually proper inquiry. Recall that 
the point of this inquiry is to determine what the agreed-upon goals of a 
corporation are, because an organization that has adopted an adequately strong 
religious purpose will attract to it persons who want to advance that purpose 
through their actions within the corporation.153 In determining what the purposes 
of an organization are, we do not simply add up the individual preferences of 
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those human beings involved in the organization; we look to the defining rules of 
the organization to ask what its purposes are, and who has the authority to define 
them. For a corporation, the state corporate law statutes and case law set the core 
legal framework for those defining rules, and the documents and practices of 
particular corporations set their purposes operating within the state law rules that 
constitute corporations. Thus, the state law rules are precisely where the federal 
courts should look in determining the RFRA standing of a corporation. The 
majority in Hobby Lobby shows no sign whatsoever that it thinks it is ignoring the 
relevant state law rules,154 and we should not lightly assume that it is doing so. The 
Court’s attribution of a religious purpose given the facts of the case in front of it is 
most easily justified legally under a strong stakeholder conception of the 
corporation, and we should take the opinion as, at least to some extent, an 
endorsement of that conception.155 
One other facet of the opinion worth noting is its repeated reference to 
closely held corporations. Some have taken this as a sign that only closely held 
corporations may claim an exemption under RFRA. Most notable of those drawing 
this inference are the agencies that implement the ACA. In their proposed revision 
to the definition of “eligible organizations” that can claim an accommodation to 
the contraceptive requirement, the agencies limit RFRA protection to closely held 
corporations.156 This is certainly inconsistent with the corporate law and theory 
reviewed in Part III. It also does not follow from the Supreme Court’s opinion. It is 
true that the three corporations at issue in that case were all closely held, and in a 
proper exercise of judicial prudence the Court did not extend its reasoning well 
beyond the facts of the case in front of it. The Court does note that getting 
shareholders in a public corporation to agree to a religious purpose is improbable, 
and thus it is unlikely that many, if any, public corporations will adopt the kind of 
commitments that would make them eligible for a RFRA accommodation.157 It 
then states “we have no occasion in these cases to consider RFRA’s applicability 
to such companies.”158 That does not mean the Court concluded that only closely 
held corporations may claim a RFRA accommodation. As we have seen, the 
fundamental corporate law principles that govern all U.S. business corporations, 
and which the Court repeatedly refers to, dictate that should a public corporation 
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choose to commit to a religious purpose, that would be as legitimate and valid as a 
closely held corporation doing so.159 
Thus, the majority decision in Hobby Lobby fits well with the framework 
for determining RFRA standing elaborated here, which in turn fits well with the 
prevailing progressive conception of the corporation. It includes a strong 
stakeholder conception of corporate purpose and duty, wherein corporations and 
their officers and directors have much freedom to adopt and pursue goals other 
than maximizing the financial returns of shareholders. Separate corporate 
personality is recognized but not fetishized. That is, corporations are not identified 
with their shareholders, but rather seen as a collective organization in which a 
variety of constituencies work together to further their own interests and 
conceptions of the good. We look to how a corporation has defined its purposes to 
determine whether a particular corporation has adopted enough of a religious 
purpose for it to appropriately claim standing under RFRA. Shareholder ownership 
and beliefs play a role in this analysis—inevitably so, given the authority that 
shareholders have in corporate law (especially the authority to elect directors, as 
well as the authority to set rules in the charter and bylaws). While the various roles 
of shareholders, directors, and officers tend to blend together in corporations like 
Hobby Lobby, Mardel, and Conestoga Wood, other sources of organizational 
commitment are equally, if not more important. Corporate law liberals may not 
identify with the sorts of religious commitments one finds in this case. However, 
they should very much identify with, and approve of, corporations that have so 
visibly and consciously chosen to pursue their visions of the public good along 
with profit. As compared with the kind of socially responsible corporations that 
progressives lionize and want to enable through the law,160 Hobby Lobby is very 
similar—it is just its particular vision of the public good, and the source of that 
vision, that differs. 
It is thus a shame, and somewhat puzzling, that the prevailing liberal and 
progressive response to the corporate standing element of Hobby Lobby has been 
so hostile.161 I note in conclusion on this element that there is serious tension 
between two different liberal complaints about corporate standing. One of these 
complaints, seen best in the corporate law professor amicus brief,162 is concerned 
that the Court gives too much emphasis to the beliefs of individual shareholders, 
ignoring the importance of separate corporate personality. A more popular 
complaint is that the Court’s rationale for granting standing is not as limited as the 
Court claims. Even though the Court stresses at several points that its analysis in 
the opinion only applies to closely held corporations, many fear that the Court’s 
reasoning may eventually sweep further, and note that the Court does not define 
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what it means by “closely held.”163 This second complaint is right—for the most 
part. The Court’s reasoning allows RFRA standing in some circumstances where a 
corporation is not closely held, although those circumstances are likely to be 
extremely rare, if not nonexistent in practice. But that shows precisely that the 
Court has not ignored separate corporate personality, as the first type of complaint 
asserts. Where the second sort of complaint goes wrong is that it does not have a 
good theory for why a broader conception of RFRA standing is objectionable. The 
underlying emotion seems to be that corporations are dodgy, profit-obsessed 
forces, which should not be allowed to be free of valid legal restrictions.164 But 
that objection, in turn, ignores the whole progressive corporate law project of 
creating a legal and practical space for socially responsible corporations. Many 
corporations are indeed profit-obsessed organizations that trample on other values, 
but many are not, and nothing in the law requires that they be that way. The 
majority decision in Hobby Lobby recognizes this, and liberals should celebrate 
that. 
A response to this claim that the majority opinion embodies a liberal 
vision of the corporation is: Progressive corporate law is about doing more than 
the law requires, whereas Hobby Lobby is about opting out of legal 
requirements.165 But both progressive corporate law and the Hobby Lobby opinion 
agree in seeing corporations as ways for like-minded persons to come together to 
pursue shared goals to advance a shared vision of the common good in ways that 
go beyond simply complying with the law. The key issue that the RFRA context 
brings to the forefront is that different groups and corporations may have different 
conceptions of the common good and how to pursue it—indeed, in a diverse 
society, that happens all of the time. What, then, should we do when a corporation 
pursuing a religiously grounded view of the good runs into conflict with a legal 
rule? Can we make room for both the group’s vision and achieving the purposes of 
the law? That brings us to the operation of RFRA once one has determined that a 
particular organization’s objection to following a law is indeed grounded in the 
exercise of religion—the subject to which we now turn. 
V. SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN 
The Court’s holding on corporate standing has received the most 
attention, and for good reason, as that holding applies to a multitude of federal 
statutes. However, the opinion does not end with the discussion of corporate 
standing (nor does its criticism). Once the Court holds that the corporate plaintiffs 
may invoke the protection of RFRA, it must then go on to apply the statute. That 
happens in two steps. First, the Court must decide whether or not the complained-
of ACA mandate imposes a substantial burden on the plaintiffs’ exercise of 
religion. If it determines the answer is yes, as the majority does in Hobby Lobby, it 
must then ask whether this application of the ACA can be justified under the strict 
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scrutiny standard, i.e., as the least restrictive means for achieving a compelling 
governmental interest. 
Both of these steps have produced widespread scorn and fear from liberal 
commentators. In some cases that reaction stems from ignorance about what the 
Court actually said and did, but certainly not always. Indeed, Justice Ginsburg’s 
dissent nicely illustrates the strength of the reaction. The opening of that dissent 
deserves extended quotation: 
In a decision of startling breadth, the Court holds that commercial 
enterprises, including corporations, along with partnerships and sole 
proprietorships, can opt out of any law (saving only tax laws) they 
judge incompatible with their sincerely held religious beliefs. 
Compelling governmental interests in uniform compliance with the 
law, and disadvantages that religion-based opt-outs impose on 
others, hold no sway, the Court decides, at least where there is a 
“less restrictive alternative.” And such an alternative, the Court 
suggests, there always will be whenever, in lieu of tolling an 
enterprise claiming a religion-based exemption, the government, 
i.e., the general public, can pick up the tab. 
. . . In the Court’s view, RFRA demands accommodation of for-
profit corporation’s religious beliefs no matter the impact that 
accommodation may have on third parties who do not share the 
corporation owners’ religious faith—in these cases, thousands of 
women employed by Hobby Lobby and Conestoga or dependents of 
persons those corporations employ. Persuaded that Congress 
enacted RFRA to serve a far less radical purpose, and mindful of the 
havoc the Court’s judgment can introduce, I dissent.166 
There is no “respectfully” in that “I dissent.” It is strong stuff, and it is far 
from just the holding on corporate standing that Justice Ginsburg finds so 
disturbing. 
In much of the reaction to Hobby Lobby, it seems easy to detect some 
resistance to RFRA itself, with a desire to limit the reach of that statute. Why 
might one find such resistance, given the strong support of liberals at RFRA’s 
origin, and given RFRA’s roots in earlier Supreme Court opinions endorsed by 
many of the most liberal justices in the history of the Court?167 
One concern may be the great potential breadth of RFRA. It applies to all 
statutes, even though they say nothing about religion, and have no purpose of 
burdening religion.168 The federal government has a huge number of statutes, and 
there are a huge variety of competing religious groups in the United States.169 If 
“significant burden” is interpreted expansively, then it could easily happen that 
even the most well intentioned of statutes significantly burden some persons’ 
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religious beliefs under some circumstances.170 Moreover, if the strict scrutiny 
language is interpreted as being strict in theory, but fatal in fact, that will lead to a 
large number of accommodations. Insofar as liberals are more generally positive 
than conservatives about the large number of restrictions on private behavior 
contained in our modern administrative state, they might be more attuned to a 
threat to the wide web of federal statutes and regulations. 
However, this critique of the RFRA principle was well understood before 
the passage of RFRA—it forms the core of Justice Scalia’s decision in Smith.171 
And yet, that critique obviously did not stop liberal dissents in that case or liberal 
support of RFRA.172 In what follows, I will give due regard for this concern about 
an overly aggressive use of RFRA, but I do not think it adequately explains the 
highly polarized reaction to Hobby Lobby. I am afraid that another part of the 
reaction is that liberals today see RFRA primarily as an assertion of power by 
conservative Christians against laws that reflect liberal victories in the ongoing 
culture wars.173 The ACA is one such victory and much comment on Hobby Lobby 
has focused on speculation about the implications for protections against 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, another major battle site in the 
culture wars.174 Why the change from when RFRA passed in 1993? The answer 
may be that the perceived beneficiaries of the RFRA principle have shifted. In the 
old Free Exercise cases, the plaintiffs were religious groups that were generally on 
the fringes of society—Amish, Seventh Day Adventists, and persons engaged in 
traditional Native American rituals. Liberals were more inclined to sympathize 
with such relative social outcasts. In Hobby Lobby, the ACA provision was 
objectionable to a wider array of more mainstream religious organizations, which 
is also true for the much discussed possible application of RFRA to anti-gay 
discrimination laws.175 Conservatives on the Court, most prominently Justice 
Scalia himself, have hence switched from Justice Scalia’s position in Smith to 
strong support of RFRA, while liberals have made the opposite switch. 
If this is a part of the explanation for the reaction to Hobby Lobby, it is a 
shame. It represents a repudiation of some of the core values of the liberal 
tradition.176 Many who would call themselves liberals seem to have forgotten that 
the word is derived from “liberty,” and support for liberty includes support for 
religious liberty.177 The United States is a large and diverse country, with many 
religious groups holding deeply opposed core beliefs. Whenever a law forces 
believers of some religion to violate strongly held beliefs in order to comply with 
that law, we have made it harder for such diversity to thrive.178 That is a loss to 
those who value being part of a diverse society—which should be understood as a 
core commitment of liberalism. 
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Of course, sometimes there is no way to avoid a conflict between genuine 
beliefs and the imperatives driving a law. But some laws may reflect the views of a 
majority that at the time of enactment had the power to pass the law, and which 
majority did little to consider the effect on those who did not share some core 
beliefs.179 Even for laws that do not reflect such a one-sided imposition of 
contested beliefs, the laws may be applied in a variety of circumstances that were 
not anticipated, and may cause distress to some religious believers in ways that the 
drafters would have wanted to avoid had they anticipated it.180 
For these reasons, it makes sense to ask whether a law causes some 
people to act against religious beliefs that are important to them, and when the 
answer is yes, to ask further whether there is some accommodation that can 
eliminate or reduce the conflict while still achieving the legitimate goals of the 
law. That is what RFRA does. There are dangers if one applies this principle too 
vigorously, but also a loss if we do not apply it vigorously enough. So, let us 
examine how the Court applies RFRA in Hobby Lobby, and see if it strikes a 
proper balance. The remainder of this section considers the substantial burden 
inquiry, and the following section considers the strict scrutiny inquiry. To 
anticipate my conclusions, I think the Court reaches the right results in both 
inquiries, with generally good arguments. In both sections, I see some potential 
concerns for future cases, and I suggest modifications that may strike a better 
balance. 
How should a court determine whether a law substantially burdens a 
person’s religious beliefs? I find this to be the hardest part of Hobby Lobby to get a 
handle on, and I have swung back and forth on how best to think about it. It 
provides somewhat chilly comfort to realize that the substantial burden prong 
seems to have been problematic for both courts and scholars for decades.181 The 
majority opinion in Hobby Lobby takes a subjective approach to this question, 
while the dissent takes an objective approach. Each approach has complementary 
strengths and weaknesses. 
The substantial burden puzzle in Hobby Lobby comes from the oddly 
indirect nature of the burden. The corporations are not being forced to buy 
contraceptives for themselves,182 nor are they supplying contraceptives directly to 
their employees. They are paying insurers to provide payment for medical services 
and items. If an employee asks for contraception and her doctor chooses to write a 
prescription, the insurer will then pay for them. The employer is pretty far 
removed from the decision to use the contraceptives. Even if the employer objects 
to their use because it believes them to be an abortifacient, does this indirect tie to 
the objectionable actions mean there is no substantial burden on the employer? 
On this issue, persons and religions may differ both as to the morality of 
the contraceptives and also as to the hard moral question of how much moral 
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agency one must have in a particular action in order to be complicit in that action. 
Imagine persons belonging to three religions. According to religion A, there is 
nothing wrong with the contraceptives. According to religion B, the contraceptives 
are wrong, but not drastically so, and it has a fairly relaxed understanding of causal 
complicity, so the employer’s role in this situation is a minor transgression. 
According to religion C, the contraceptives are profoundly evil, and it has a strict 
understanding of causal complicity, so the employer’s role would be seen as 
deeply wrong, in ways that strike at core beliefs. How should we analyze the 
burden in these three cases? 
Using the subjective approach of the Hobby Lobby majority, there is no 
burden for believers of religion A, because there is no violation of religious belief 
at all. However, believers of religions B and C are treated the same. The Court 
simply asks whether the employer’s proscribed actions violate sincerely held 
beliefs, as they do for both religions. It does not ask about how strongly held those 
beliefs are.183 The only question it asks about degree of burden concerns the legal 
penalty involved for violating the law. Here, the fines imposed are quite 
substantial—and of course, the fines are the same for B and C. 
Why treat the two cases as the same? The Court does not want to be 
drawn into debates as to the reasonableness of competing moral views. The 
question of complicity is a hard moral question,184 and the Court does not want to 
say that some religions have a better answer than others185 (as we shall see, the 
dissent’s approach does that). The core purpose of RFRA is to respect the variety 
of religious beliefs; were the Court to start treating the beliefs of one religion as 
less substantial than the beliefs of another, it would be acting at odds with that 
purpose.186 
But this approach has a weakness. It forces the Court to take any assertion 
of a burden as substantial, as long as that assertion is sincere. If a plaintiff says the 
burden is substantial, and does not seem to be lying, that ends the inquiry on this 
question. But that seems problematic, for at least two reasons. First, it extends 
significantly the number of circumstances in which courts may find substantial 
burdens, thus increasing the tension between RFRA and legitimate and important 
statutory goals.187 And second, cases like believers in religion B above seem pretty 
peripheral to the concerns that motivate RFRA. RFRA is meant to ease the burden 
where believers are forced to go against important beliefs if they are to obey a 
statute. It is aimed at reducing moral dilemmas, not inconveniences.188 The 
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potential for abuse is even worse if courts are reluctant to examine the sincerity of 
RFRA plaintiffs. 
To avoid these problems, the dissent takes an objective approach. It 
asserts that the link between the religious beliefs and the ACA requirement is “too 
attenuated to rank as substantial.”189 It treats this question of attenuated or not too 
attenuated as an objective matter of law. But of course drawing the line involves 
making moral and philosophical distinctions, and different religions will differ as 
to how they draw the line. In drawing the line where it does, the dissent is taking 
sides on a deep religious debate, and telling those who disagree with its 
conclusions that their deeply held feelings of moral violation at being forced to 
behave in a way they find reprehensible simply do not count. That goes against the 
spirit of RFRA190—not surprisingly, since Justice Ginsburg seems none too moved 
by that spirit. 
This is a hard problem, and no approach is free from serious objection. 
Forced to choose, I would take the majority’s subjective approach over the 
dissent’s objective approach. At least the former takes seriously the internal 
perspective of the religious plaintiffs, which is critical to the purpose of RFRA.191 
However, if I redesigned the statute, I would implement what one might call an 
inter-subjective approach. This approach would not only look at sincerity, but also 
ask how important a particular belief is within the relevant belief system.192 Note, 
the court must work within the religious belief system of the plaintiff, taking the 
system’s beliefs and internal logic as given, and then try to determine how much 
weight a person acting within that system would assign to violating the belief in 
question. This takes the internal perspective of religions seriously, while limiting 
somewhat the application of RFRA and avoiding its use in situations where 
plaintiffs experience mere inconvenience rather than a serious moral dilemma. I 
think that such an approach has some support in the pre-Smith Free Exercise case 
law. Most notable is Yoder, in which the Court went into much detail as to how 
much harm to the Amish religion a requirement to attend school until age sixteen 
might cause.193 
However, the Supreme Court was probably not free to adopt this 
approach in Hobby Lobby. The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons 
Act of 2000 added language that specifies that the exercise of religion covers “any 
exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of 
religious belief.”194 That seems to rule out my preferred inter-subjective approach, 
which looks to the centrality of a particular belief within the broader system. I 
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think this statutory language is unwise, but the Court must work within it.195 
Forced to choose, it is probably right to choose the subjective approach. However, 
in the future the Court may want to look more closely at the sincerity of asserted 
religious beliefs, especially where a business will benefit financially from avoiding 
application of a law, raising concern that its real motivation is financial. In Hobby 
Lobby, that does not seem to be a concern, because insurance coverage should be 
no cheaper if the contraceptive coverage is dropped. This would also seem to 
alleviate any Establishment Clause concern in the case—religious corporations 
like Hobby Lobby are not gaining any competitive or financial advantage.196 
VI. LEAST RESTRICTIVE MEANS 
Having decided that the corporate plaintiffs had standing to sue under 
RFRA and that the ACA contraceptive mandate imposed a substantial burden on 
their exercise of religion, the Court had to face a final question. That question was 
whether the government could justify the mandate as the least restrictive means to 
achieve a compelling governmental interest.197 The proper way of applying this 
strict scrutiny standard has been a point of contention since the passage of 
RFRA,198 and the way in which the Court applied it in Hobby Lobby has been a 
source of anxiety for those who are suspicious of an aggressive use of the 
statute.199 
The strict scrutiny language of RFRA was taken from the pre-Smith case 
law.200 In general, the strict scrutiny standard is quite hard to meet. Once a statute 
is subjected to the standard, it is unlikely to pass the scrutiny. However, in the Free 
Exercise context, the Court wobbled somewhat over time. In some cases, it applied 
strict scrutiny in the usual rigorous way, but in other cases, it engaged in a much 
less rigorous balancing in which the government was able to justify statutes 
without too much trouble.201 
The rigor of strict scrutiny is the key reason why the Court decided to 
stop applying that standard in Smith, the case that RFRA (partially) overturned. 
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Smith noted that applying the substantial burden test to 
all facially-neutral standards would lead to applying strict scrutiny on many 
occasions, and if the strict scrutiny standard were honestly applied, it would lead to 
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requiring religious accommodations on most of those occasions.202 This critique 
has some merit, but imposing only rational basis scrutiny instead leads to weak 
protection of religious liberty, as Justice O’Connor in her concurrence203 and 
Justice Blackmun in his dissent204 point out. 
Given the validity of both perspectives, it is perhaps unfortunate (and a 
bit puzzling) that the Court did not find a rather obvious compromise. If strict 
scrutiny was too strong and rational basis was too weak, why not use the 
intermediate scrutiny standard?205 Under that standard, a law is justified if the 
means chosen are substantially related to furthering an important government 
interest.206 The whole point of this standard is to allow courts to balance competing 
concerns in circumstances where both sides are likely to have interests that the 
Court finds sympathetic, as is generally the case in Free Exercise claims. The 
failure to adopt the intermediate scrutiny standard is particularly puzzling given 
that a close analogy was easily available. In so-called time, place, and manner 
cases under the Free Speech clause, the Court applies intermediate scrutiny.207 
These are cases where a law does not directly regulate speech, but where its 
application in the circumstances at hand restricts speech. This is directly analogous 
to the Smith and RFRA circumstances, where a law that does not regulate religion 
directly operates to burden religious exercise in the circumstances at hand. Much 
subsequent complication could have been avoided had the Court adopted this 
middle ground. Using intermediate scrutiny to engage in the hard case-by-case 
balancing required to properly adjudicate in this area would be more intellectually 
honest than applying a weakened form of strict scrutiny. An intermediate scrutiny 
analysis would also avoid the problem of courts slipping into applying a strict 
standard, which creates practical and political difficulties, but which is suggested 
by the statutory language. 
For whatever reason, the Smith Court did not adopt intermediate scrutiny, 
and when Congress decided to overturn Smith, it simply adopted the strict scrutiny 
standard from the pre-Smith cases. Given the politics that now surround RFRA, 
this language seems likely to remain in place for the foreseeable future. 
Presumably Democrats would be happy to replace the strict scrutiny language with 
an intermediate scrutiny standard. However, Republicans would not agree, and so 
RFRA will not be amended as long as Republicans retain enough power within the 
House, the Senate, or the Presidency. 
And so, much depends upon how courts apply the strict scrutiny standard. 
Has the Court in Hobby Lobby really applied strict scrutiny in an aggressive and 
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reckless way, as some fear?208 I think not, although it is not completely free of 
doubt. The majority opinion assumes guaranteeing all women access to 
contraceptives is a compelling interest. Before doing so, it notes in passing that the 
existence of a number of exemptions calls into question how compelling that 
interest really is.209 That point on exemptions was the source of much argument in 
the briefs for the case,210 and there is some logic to the concern—if the government 
is willing to grant a large number of exemptions to a requirement, how compelling 
does it really find the interest underlying that requirement?211 The Ginsburg dissent 
attacks this argument concerning exemptions, noting that such exemptions are a 
common way to account for various competing interests.212 Both sides have a point 
here—one should not automatically infer from the existence of exemptions that the 
interest underlying a statute is not compelling, and yet at some point a proliferation 
of exemptions may help show that the government does not really see the asserted 
interest as all that compelling. At any rate, Justice Alito’s opinion does not pursue 
the exemption argument, because it assumes the asserted interest is compelling.213 
That leads to the question of whether the contraceptive mandate is the 
least restrictive means to achieve the compelling interest of guaranteeing women 
access to contraceptives. The Court considers two alternative means that might 
achieve that goal while restricting religious liberty less. The first of these is to have 
the government itself pay to provide the contraceptives at issue where employers 
object on religious grounds.214 Justice Alito appears quite taken with this 
alternative. Alas, it potentially opens up a can of worms: How much cost might the 
government be forced to bear in order to avoid imposing a burden on the religious 
exercise of some? Justice Alito argues that the answer is not zero cost,215 and yet 
admits that cost may be a legitimate consideration,216 and Justice Ginsburg rightly 
points out that the question of how much cost is too much has no clear dividing 
line.217 Moreover, how well can courts evaluate likely costs in determining 
whether RFRA may require government to pay? There is also an Establishment 
Clause concern lurking: If the government were required to pay a substantial 
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amount to support the employees of religious employers, would that give such 
employers a financial advantage over competitors who did not receive such a 
governmental subsidy? In that case, wouldn’t the employers with a specific 
religious belief be benefiting at the expense of others?218 
Perhaps because of these problems, Justice Alito does not rely on the 
government pays alternative219—although he may give more credence to that 
alternative than he should. Rather, the majority opinion ultimately relies upon a 
better alternative accommodation. Encouragingly, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence 
seems to put almost all of its weight upon this alternative, rather than on the option 
of having the government pay.220 
That alternative accommodation is one that HHS had already devised for 
more clearly religious employers. If an organization that HHS has designated as 
eligible for this arrangement certifies that it objects to providing coverage for some 
contraceptives, then the organization’s insurers must exclude coverage from that 
employer’s health plan and instead itself provide separate payments for the 
excluded contraceptives.221 Apparently insurers are willing to go along with this 
because the expected savings in reduced services for pregnant women balances the 
cost of the contraceptives. 
That fact is important because it means this particular accommodation has 
extremely limited scope. If one imagines, for instance, a corporation run by 
Christian scientists that objects to coverage for a broad range of medical 
procedures that violate their beliefs, even though they are willing to cover a limited 
range of medical procedures, insurers would certainly not be willing or able to pay 
for such a wide range of procedures on their own, without someone paying the 
related premiums. 
But as for the contraceptive accommodation, were the government to 
simply extend this already existing accommodation to the broader range of 
protected organizations recognized as due RFRA protection under the first part of 
the opinion, then everyone wins.222 The employers have at least less of a burden on 
their religious liberty, insurers apparently break even, and the employees will still 
get coverage of all contraceptives specified by HHS regulation at no additional 
cost. 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence puts great stress on how well this 
accommodation balances all competing interests, on how narrow it is, and on how 
much tougher the questions become where insurers are not willing to step into the 
gap.223 In both tone and substance, this concurrence creates much less of a sense of 
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aggressively imposing the strict scrutiny language of RFRA. Rather, it engages in 
a nuanced and context-specific balancing act. The result of that balancing is highly 
persuasive, given the unique circumstances surrounding the accommodation that 
had already been created for other organizations.224 To anyone who finds the 
principle underlying RFRA at all compelling, the balance here should be quite 
persuasive. The extreme reaction against the opinion seems either a 
misunderstanding of the opinion, a mistrustful fear of what is to follow, or a sign 
that many on the political left nowadays do not find the principle underlying 
RFRA at all compelling. 
There is, however, one complication in the Court’s use of this existing 
accommodation to argue that the imposition on religious corporations is not 
justified. That complication: the possibility that in the future the Court may hold 
that this accommodation itself violates RFRA. If it does so, it may have pulled off 
a nasty bait and switch. And there is some possibility that the Court will do so. 
Organizations subject to the special accommodation have sued claiming that it too 
violates RFRA.225 The majority opinion notes this, and refuses to commit as to 
how it might decide those cases.226 Several days after delivering the Hobby Lobby 
case, the Court granted a preliminary injunction in one of the cases involving this 
accommodation.227 In doing so the Court at least acknowledged that the plaintiffs 
had an argument of some strength, although it does not give any of its own 
analysis of the merits.228 
How should we understand this injunction in the Wheaton College case? 
Is the Court about to pull a bait and switch, using the availability of this limited 
accommodation to strike down the contraceptive mandate in Hobby Lobby but then 
striking down the accommodation in turn, leaving no good way to advance the 
compelling interest at stake in the mandate? It is possible, and if so, that would 
undermine much of the merit of the decision in Hobby Lobby. However, I do not 
expect such a sad outcome. Wheaton College is a preliminary injunction—one 
possibility is that the Court is just trying to maintain the status quo, but will 
ultimately side with the government. The apparent presence of Justice Breyer in 
the Wheaton College majority suggests that—it would seem very unlikely that 
Justice Breyer plans to side with the plaintiff in Wheaton College after joining the 
dissent in Hobby Lobby. 
If the Court does ultimately decide for the plaintiffs on the merits in 
Wheaton College, much will depend upon what it points to as a less restrictive 
alternative. One possibility is that the plaintiff’s victory will be Pyrrhic. Some 
language in the short order in Wheaton College suggests that the Court may decide 
that the precise procedure devised by HHS to accommodate religious employers 
imposes an unnecessary burden, but that a small tweak in the procedure would 
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make it acceptable.229 That result would be fine as well, even if it does slice the 
bologna a bit thin. If instead the Court points to a more problematic alternative, 
such as the government paying for contraceptive coverage,230 the result would be 
more disturbing, and more indicative of an aggressive use of the strict scrutiny 
language in RFRA in a way that does little to acknowledge the important goals of 
statutes subject to a RFRA claim. I can certainly see some of the justices in the 
Hobby Lobby majority going that route, but given his concurrence, it is hard to see 
Justice Kennedy doing so. 
Thus, there are some elements in Justice Alito’s least restrictive means 
analysis that could point to unwelcome developments down the line. However, 
other elements of that analysis are quite strong, especially when viewed through 
the lens of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence.231 The result in the case itself is fully 
justified. Those who are objecting so vigorously need to explain why we should 
not be making this low-cost, win-win accommodation available. Yes, the ACA is 
an important statute—it promotes many important goals, and represents probably 
the most important liberal achievement within the federal government since the 
presidency of Lyndon Johnson. The contraception mandate in particular advances 
goals that most liberals do and should affirm as compelling. But, all that should not 
stop us from understanding that some persons do deeply object to that mandate, 
and where they act as employers they do honestly believe that providing insurance 
on such terms is profoundly at odds with their personal religious commitments. If 
we can readily respond to those objections so that female employees will still get 
the mandated coverage at no extra cost, why on earth not do so? Doesn’t the 
opposition to this accommodation show a complete lack of any empathy with the 
religious beliefs and strivings of those like the plaintiffs in Hobby Lobby? And is 
that lack of empathy at all consistent with the traditional liberal commitment to a 
diverse society and religious liberty? 
CONCLUSION 
In case you hadn’t noticed, those last few questions are rhetorical. I find 
the emotional reaction against the Hobby Lobby case dispiriting. It shows no 
empathy for persons with differing worldviews, mostly ignores the detailed facts 
and reasoning in the case, and shows a desire to crush all opposition,232 even where 
a highly limited and reasonable accommodation that should hurt no one is 
available. In part this flows from suspicion about what is to follow. That suspicion 
is not groundless—we have seen various points where Justice Alito’s opinion 
could be taken in disturbing directions, particularly in a potential willingness to 
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take all professions of being burdened as automatically self-authenticating,233 his 
toying with the government-pays option as a less restrictive alternative,234 and the 
possibility that he and his colleagues may pull a bait and switch by invalidating the 
compromise accommodation used to show that something better could be done for 
the plaintiffs in Hobby Lobby.235 I too have some worries about where many 
members of the majority of the opinion will side on these matters in the future, 
although Justice Kennedy’s concurrence makes me fairly optimistic that for now a 
majority of the Court will not move in that direction. Liberal suspicion also reflects 
the highly polarized politics surrounding the Court, and indeed the United States in 
general. 
But the strength of the anti-Hobby Lobby outrage seems to go well 
beyond these somewhat reasonable sources of concern to an underlying suspicion 
of RFRA itself. I suggest above my take on why the politics on RFRA have shifted 
from strong initial support to current opposition.236 Originally, RFRA and the old 
Free Exercise Clause case law it resurrected were seen as supporting 
nonmainstream religious minorities, and such support fit well with liberal support 
for diversity and the disempowered. Now, RFRA seems to have become a tool for 
more mainstream conservative religious groups who are fighting rearguard actions 
in the culture wars after losses in the legislature.237 As the victors in the legislature, 
many liberals are unwilling to give aid to their enemies, especially because those 
enemies are still politically powerful and trying to limit the liberties of others, such 
as pregnant women and gay people.238 Not only does this reflect poorly on the 
depth of their commitment to core values of liberty, it is probably politically 
unwise as well. In the current climate, a robust use of RFRA can help turn down 
the intensity of the culture wars. If religious conservatives feel they have some 
protection against statutes that may force them to act against deeply held beliefs, 
                                                                                                                
 233. See supra notes 182–88 and accompanying text. 
 234. See supra notes 214–20 and accompanying text. 
 235. See supra notes 225–29 and accompanying text. 
 236. See supra notes 167–78 and accompanying text. 
 237. For what it’s worth, this story may also explain how some conservatives 
have also switched from the Smith opinion and many of the decisions leading up to Smith, 
where conservative justices were more skeptical of strong religious liberty protection, to 
today where conservatives aggressively push RFRA. When they were clearly in power, 
many mainstream religious conservatives were none too concerned about the free exercise 
rights of odd outlier groups. Now that they themselves are losing control, they are happy to 
seek protection by invoking the principle of religious liberty. Neither side of the aisle comes 
out looking too good in the evolution of the politics of RFRA, although it is worth noting 
that many conservative political groups supported RFRA in Congress in 1993—the 
phenomenon of conservative opposition to RFRA’s principle may have been stronger within 
the Court in the sixties through eighties than in politics. It is worth noting, though, that 
RFRA is still sometimes used to protect less mainstream religious believers. See, e.g., 
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) 
(protecting use of hallucinogenic sacramental tea by a Brazilian church). 
 238. Laycock, supra note 24, at 879. 
822 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 57:777 
they have less incentive to follow a scorched earth legislative and political 
strategy.239 
The other main source of the outrage pertaining to the Hobby Lobby 
decision stems from its corporate standing holding. There is some legitimate cause 
for misgiving there as well. The majority opinion is rather hazy on the details of 
corporate law and structure, and some language puts too much emphasis on the 
views of individual shareholders rather than on the statements and actions of the 
corporation itself.240 There is room for corporate law scholars of all stripes to argue 
over what exactly the opinion says and how it may be applied in future situations. 
But the core of popular reaction against this part of the decision seems to be 
populist distrust of corporations and ridicule over the idea of corporations as 
persons. That reaction is rooted in some highly genuine concerns about the role of 
corporations in modern society and politics;241 still, those concerns are completely 
misplaced in this instance. The liberal and progressive agenda within corporate law 
is to create as much legal, practical, and ideological space as possible for 
corporations that pursue a variety of social values while still looking to make some 
money. Justice Alito’s opinion fits readily within that agenda. 
Thus, Justice Alito’s majority opinion rests on two core principles: (1) a 
broad understanding of the potential social purposes of corporations; and (2) a 
commitment to reducing the burden on diverse religious groups within society. 
How sad it is to see so many liberals condemning a decision based on values they 
have traditionally held dear. 
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